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Digital Patent Infringement in an Era 
of 3D Printing 
Timothy R. Holbrook†* & Lucas S. Osborn** 
The digital revolution has now moved beyond music and video files. A 
person can now translate three-dimensional objects into digital files and, 
at the press of a button, recreate those items via a 3D printer or similar 
device. Just as digitization placed pressure on the copyright system, so will 
these digital computer-aided design (“CAD”) files stress the patent system. 
Patents directed to physical objects can now have their value appropriated 
not only by the transfer of physical embodiments but also by the 
transferring of CAD files designed to print the invention. We term this 
phenomenon digital patent infringement. 
In this Article, we explore the ways the patent system can respond to 
protect patent owners against the appropriation of their inventions via 
these digital files. First, we explore whether indirect infringement 
doctrines sufficiently protect patent holders against these CAD files. Given 
the nature of likely accused indirect infringers, we conclude, contrary to 
earlier literature, that these doctrines likely are not up to the task. 
Second, we offer novel theories of direct “digital” patent infringement 
based on the CAD files alone. We consider whether offers to sell and sales 
of these files should constitute direct patent infringement. Because such 
commercial activity is an appropriation of the economic value of the 
patented invention, we believe the law should recognize such an 
infringement theory. Next, rejecting the prior assumptions of the 
literature, we explore whether the CAD files alone should be viewed as 
infringement for making the patented device, given the de minimis effort 
it takes to create the item via a 3D printer or related device. As a 
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technological matter, the line between the digital and the tangible has 
eroded to the point where the file and the item are viewed as 
interchangeable. Under this view, the files alone should be infringing. As a 
legal and policy matter, however, such expansion of patent infringement 
liability could have significant chilling effects on other actors and 
incentives, giving us pause in extending liability in this context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to believe that the first iPod was released in 2001, a mere 
fourteen years ago.1 We quickly moved from bulky Sony Walkmans, to 
the click-wheel iPods with mini-hard drives, to now having flash 
memory. CDs, the previously disruptive technology that sent vinyl 
albums into the dustbin of history, were quickly displaced by digital 
music files and portable music players. This transition in our culture from 
a physical to a digital world has occurred at an impressive, if not dizzying, 
pace. From smartphone apps to digital music streaming services, our 
world has replaced the tangible and the analog with the digital. 
Since the 1990s, the ability to make and share multiple copies of 
two-dimensional pictures and movies with negligible cost has brought 
benefits, such as increased access to information and cultural 
innovation. Yet the facility with which one can make and share digital 
copies has brought tremendous pressure on the copyright regime from 
unauthorized digital books, movies, images, and songs. The terms 
Napster, Grokster, and BitTorrent instantly call to mind the impact 
digitization has had on the entertainment and music industries. But 
the process is not over yet, and the digital world and the physical 
world continue to intertwine and merge. The line between hardware 
and software has effectively eroded.2 For example, most of our buttons 
on smart phones are now “virtual” — icons on a screen — rather than 
physical, mechanical objects. 
New technologies now are adding a (literal) third dimension to the 
commingling of the physical and digital worlds, allowing people to 
create complex, tangible objects directly from digital files. For 
example, three-dimensional printers, scanners, and computer-aided 
design (“CAD”) programs allow people to translate physical objects 
into digital files and, more ominously for patent holders, to then 
translate the digital files back into physical objects.3 With these 3D 
printers, we can now move, almost seamlessly, between the physical 
 
 1 Apple Press Info, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/pr/products/ipodhistory/ (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2014). 
 2 See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“[P]rocess and product — software and hardware — are practically 
interchangeable in the field of computer technology. On a functioning computer, 
software morphs into hardware and vice versa at the touch of a button.” (citation 
omitted)). See generally Mike Bacidore, Software Replaces Machine Hardware, but 
Mechanical Solutions Still Have Their Places, CONTROL DESIGN (Oct. 8, 2009), http:// 
www.controldesign.com/articles/2009/mechanicalsolutions0910 (providing examples 
of software overtaking hardware with respect to electronic device controls). 
 3 See discussion infra Part I. 
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and the digital worlds. Additionally, advances in chemistry and 
biology allow scientists to digitally design DNA and other chemicals 
and to feed digital files to a machine that will directly manufacture the 
molecules.4 Collectively, we term these technologies digital 
manufacturing technology (“DMT”). 
Like previous digitization technologies, these new technologies 
bring both excitement and stress. In particular, DMT places pressure 
on all aspects of the intellectual property regime.5 One respected 
research firm predicts that by 2018, intellectual property theft due to 
3D printing alone will create losses of $100 billion per year.6 The 
focus of this Article is the impact DMT is having7 and will have on the 
patent system.8 
Historically, someone could only infringe a patent if there was a 
physical embodiment of the invention claimed in the patent.9 To 
infringe, someone had to build the “better mousetrap,” complete with 
springs and levers, not simply design it on paper. Even patents on 
processes or methods are typically infringed when there is a machine 
or other device that performs the process.10 If we create a new method 
 
 4 See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 5 See Lucas S. Osborn, Intellectual Property’s Digital Future, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 
forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2533673; Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The 
Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 582-92 (2014) 
[hereinafter Regulating 3D Printing]. 
 6 Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on Ethics and 
Regulation, GARTNER (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2658315. 
 7 See Heesun Wee, The ‘Gold Rush’ for 3-D Printing Patents, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2013, 
10:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100942655 (documenting fervent patent activity 
related to 3D printing). 
 8 Intellectual property regimes in other countries also will have to wrestle with 
the impact of 3D printing. See, e.g., Pedro Malaquias, The 3D Printing Revolution: An 
Intellectual Property Analysis (Aug. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495416 (discussing impact of 3D 
printing on UK intellectual property law). 
 9 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent 
Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale 
Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 755 
(2003) [hereinafter Threat of a Sale] (“Historically, for there to be infringement, the 
allegedly infringing device had to be in a physically complete form.”); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use Exemption to Patent 
Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 254-57 (discussing patent law’s adjustments 
to intangible business method and software patents). 
 10 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (Ct. Cl. 
1980) (explaining that a method of controlling satellites was infringed by the 
particular system in question); Acme Steel Co. v. E. Venetian Blind Co., 130 F. Supp. 
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of making aspirin, we will infringe only when a plant is built, and we 
begin to use the method. 
This historical anchoring to the physical, however, has its roots in 
the industrial age, when most innovation actually did relate to tangible 
things.11 In the digital era, it is at best unclear whether we should 
retain the vestiges of an earlier era when assessing the scope of patent 
infringement. While courts have confronted these issues on the front 
end — assessing whether patents should cover intangible inventions 
like software or methods of doing business12 — they have yet to 
wrestle with these issues on the backend when assessing infringement 
based on DMT technologies. 
At first blush, digital patent infringement might seem preposterous. 
After all, creating blueprints for a patented device does not infringe a 
claim directed to the device.13 But a dismissive reaction ignores the 
potential impact on the economic value of a patent. Even now, a 
person who possesses a digital file of a wrench or a fuel injector is a 
3D printer and one push of a button away from having the physical 
item itself. As quality 3D printers make their way into the average 
person’s home, the difference between having a CAD file and having 
the physical object will become increasingly inconsequential. 
Moreover, people can print the physical object in the privacy of their 
office or home without the need to purchase the physical device from 
a mass-produced source. Hence, DMT decentralizes and partially 
anonymizes the manufacture of tangible objects, inviting comparisons 
 
459, 465-68 (D. Md. 1955) (comparing the claimed method to the machine accused of 
performing the method to find no infringement); cf. Richard S. Gruner, Intangible 
Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 
355-57, 360 (2002).  
 11 See Gruner, supra note 10, at 360. 
 12 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (holding 
that a method of intermediated settlement was not patent eligible even if computer 
implemented); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (ruling that a method of 
hedging against risk of commodity price fluctuations was ineligible for patent 
protection); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, No. 2013-1505, 2014 WL 
6845152, at *1, *12 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014) (holding that “systems and methods of 
generating a composite web page” were eligible for patent protection). 
 13 Niks v. Marinette Paper Co., 11 F.R.D. 384, 385 (N.D.N.Y. 1951) (indicating 
that blueprints of a physical device alone are not sufficient to find patent 
infringement); Luten v. Camp, 221 F. 424, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (“The substantial issue 
is whether the defendants have infringed the plaintiff’s patents. The materiality and 
relevancy of the contract and blueprints is dependent upon the plaintiff establishing 
(1) that they infringe, and (2) that they were produced by or under the direction of 
any of the defendants leading up to the contract, or are part of a contract entered into 
between any of the defendants.”). 
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to file-sharing technologies that brought consternation to the media 
industries.14 If we can make our own patented wrenches in the privacy 
of our own homes, why bother to purchase them from the patent 
owner?15 
If these digital files undermine the economic value of a patented 
invention, then they risk undermining the incentives that the patent 
system is meant to create.16 Unless the patentee can exert a measure of 
control over the CAD files that will manufacture her patented 
invention, her incentive to engage in innovative activity will be 
dampened. 
Because the line between the tangible and intangible is increasingly 
blurred, the patent system will have to react. In short, is there (and 
should there be) a difference between an infringing, tangible item and 
a digital file that effortlessly allows the creation of that same tangible 
item?17 If so, what are the appropriate infringement scenarios that will 
adequately protect patent owners without creating undue costs on 
competitors and other innovators? 
We confront this situation directly, offering a doctrinal and 
normative assessment of such “digital” patent infringement. In so 
doing, we fill a gap in the literature on what constitutes infringement 
relating to digital technologies. To date, commentators have assumed 
without much analysis that digital files do not infringe patent claims 
directed to a physical device.18 We challenge that assumption and, for 
 
 14 See Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: 
Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483, 1493-1502 (2014) (comparing 3D printing 
and file sharing); Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the 
Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 
726-28 (2005) (describing peer-to-peer filesharing and the recording industry’s 
reaction to it). 
 15 Or, for that matter, to purchase parts to repair items we already own. See Kelsey 
B. Wilbanks, The Challenges of 3D Printing to the Repair-Reconstruction Doctrine in 
Patent Law, 20 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 1147, 1147-48 (2013). 
 16 See generally, e.g., William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 
374-76 (2011) (describing the incentive theory through which inventors can recoup 
research and development costs). 
 17 Cf. Simon Bradshaw, Adrian Bowyer & Patrick Haufe, The Intellectual Property 
Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 7 SCRIPTED 5, 26-27 (2010) (discussing 
potential theories of infringement for files under the United Kingdom’s patent laws), 
available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-1/bradshaw.asp. 
 18 See, e.g., MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, IT WILL BE AWESOME IF THEY 
DON’T SCREW IT UP 12 (2010), available at https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/ 
docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf [hereinafter IT WILL BE AWESOME] 
(“Unlike with copyright infringement, the mere possession or downloading of a file is 
not enough to create infringement liability.”); Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to 
Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use,” 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
  
2015] Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing 1325 
the first time in the literature, explore whether the patent system 
should recognize infringement based on these digital files alone. 
Specifically, we explore whether and when digital files that can 
directly print operable physical objects might infringe a patent claim 
directed to the underlying physical object.19 For example, imagine a 
patent containing a claim directed to an improved rocket fuel injector, 
but containing no claim to a CAD file capable of printing it. We 
explore whether a person might infringe the claim by the 
unauthorized creation or distribution of a CAD file that would print 
— with no extra assembly required — the exact claimed fuel 
injector.20 We refer to this sort of infringement as digital patent 
infringement. 
 
ENT. L.J. 771, 790 (2013) [hereinafter Asserting Patents] (“If a patent claims a physical 
product, that physical product is what must be sold or offered for sale in order to 
satisfy §271(a).”); Nicole A. Syzdek, Five Stages of Patent Grief to Achieve 3D Printing 
Acceptance, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 13), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423571 (“A user’s actions fail to trigger direct infringement 
under § 271(a) unless the physical patented product is in fact printed.”); Sam Dillon, 
Note, Infringement by Blueprint: Protecting Patent Rights in a World of Low-Cost 3D 
Printing, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 443 (2014) (“But direct infringement of a patent covering 
an object would not occur when someone creates . . . a [CAD file] of that object.”); 
Davis Doherty, Note, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D 
Printing Revolution, 26 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 353, 360 (2012) (assuming that a user 
would not be “liable for uploading the CAD file, though she may be liable for any 
copies of the object that she printed in the process of developing her design”); Charles 
W. Finocchiaro, Note, Personal Factory or Catalyst for Piracy? The Hype, Hysteria, and 
Hard Realities of Consumer 3-D Printing, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 473, 498 
(2013). These commentators have focused their infringement analyses on indirect 
infringement. 
 19 One might draft a patent claim directed to the digital file itself. See Daniel 
Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for Claiming 3D-Printable 
Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 13-26), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560816 (discussing strategies 
to claim CAD files themselves); Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587 
n.206; Dillon, supra note 18, at 452-55. But that strategy is not our focus. Whether 
such a claim would constitute patentable subject matter is not clear. See infra notes 
297–301 and accompanying text. We note, however, that whether claims to CAD files 
for inventions should constitute patentable subject matter is relevant to our discussion 
in Parts III and IV of whether courts should recognize claims for digital patent 
infringement. Generally, if the law should allow claims for digital infringement, it 
should allow claims to CAD files stored on a medium. But the law is not always so 
clean and symmetrical. Even if such a claim would work, before 3D printing is fully 
mature, patentees may not know they need to draft claims covering CAD files, leaving 
a potential gap in protection. 
 20 NASA has used 3D printed rocket fuel injectors. See Press Release, Rachel Kraft, 
NASA, NASA Tests Limits of 3-D Printing with Powerful Rocket Engine Check (Aug. 
27, 2013), available at http://www.nasa.gov/press/2013/august/nasa-tests-limits-of-3-d-
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Expansion of the patent system to include forms of digital 
infringement, however, may generate undesirable costs. For example, 
one of the laudable aspects of the system is encouraging subsequent 
innovators to “design around” a patented invention — making 
changes to their product to avoid infringing a patent. Efforts to design 
around a patent may in fact further the progress in the relevant 
technological field.21 One way that someone may be able to design 
around effectively is to create various computer models and designs 
and test them through virtual modeling. Overly robust protection of 
DMT could chill this aspect of the patent system. 
As patent law confronts digital patent infringement, lawmakers can 
look to its sister system — the copyright system — for comparison. 
Copyright has been addressing issues of digitization for quite some 
time, with illegal downloading and sharing of music challenging 
traditional business models for creating music and other forms of 
entertainment. 
There are important differences, however, between patent law and 
copyright law. Copyright law requires actual copying of a work, 
whereas patent law merely requires that the item be made, used, sold, 
offered to sell, or imported.22 Copying is not required. Further, 
copyright law protects a work even if copied in different media.23 The 
courts made clear early that a copy of software in computer memory 
constitutes a “copy” for infringement purposes because it is in a fixed, 
tangible medium.24 Patent law, as one of the most powerful forms of 
strict liability, does not have a clear rule that the digital version of a 
 
printing-with-powerful-rocket-engine-check/#.U9EvJlbF9g0. 
 21 See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to 
‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a 
steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property 
and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1444 (2013) (“Unlike copyright, patent 
does not protect independent inventors from infringement liability.”). 
 23 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining copies in part as “material objects . . . in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed”). 
 24 See MAI v. Peak, 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a copy in a 
computer’s RAM memory “creates a copy under the Copyright Act”); see also NAT’L 
COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 13 
(1978) (“[T]he placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a 
copy . . . .”). The copyright statue expressly allows an owner of a software copy (e.g., a 
CD) to make an additional copy in the computer’s RAM, which is necessary to use the 
software. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012). 
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physical object is in fact an embodiment of the patented invention.25 
The question is whether we should treat digital files in the patent 
context in a manner akin to those in copyright. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly introduces 3D 
printing and biochemical molecular manufacturing as examples of 
DMT. Part II turns to patent law’s indirect infringement regime, 
namely induced and contributory infringement. Because scholarly 
commentary thus far has focused on the exposure of creators and 
distributors of CAD files under patent law’s indirect infringement 
regime, Part II reviews the existing commentary and highlights the 
flaws in current conceptualizations of indirect infringement. We offer 
a novel analysis of indirect infringement’s specific intent requirement 
that takes account of a unique phenomenon with DMT: laypeople as 
massive indirect infringers. After more than 100 years of indirect 
infringement by increasingly sophisticated companies, infringement 
will come full circle to its nineteenth-century paradigm of laypeople as 
indirect infringers. Having unsophisticated actors contributing to 
patent infringement raises novel questions regarding when liability 
should attach and whether the inquiry should be objective or 
subjective. In addition, Part II recognizes two potentially gaping holes 
in the contributory infringement paradigm that stem from the 
paradigm’s requirement that an accused infringer sell or offer to sell 
(or import) a component of the patented invention.26 First, many 
accused infringers will not sell or offer CAD files for sale; they will 
give them away, thus potentially escaping liability.27 Second, CAD files 
may not constitute “components” of the patented invention, offering 
an additional means to avoid liability. 
The difficulty of capturing CAD file distributors under indirect 
infringement theories risks rendering patentees helpless to redress the 
real economic harms they incur. As such, Part III confronts the 
potential for there to be direct patent infringement based on the digital 
files themselves alone, even absent the actual creation of the object 
through a 3D printer. Our analysis contravenes the present 
assumption that that making, selling, and offering to sell CAD files 
does not constitute direct infringement of a patent claim directed to 
the underlying physical object.28 We first explore whether efforts to 
commercialize CAD files could and should constitute direct 
 
 25 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 586-87. 
 26 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 27 We find support in this assertion by analogy to the myriad infringing music and 
movie files that have been “shared” around the internet without charging a fee. 
 28 See supra note 18. 
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infringement for selling or offering to sell the claimed invention. 
Because such commercial activity is an appropriation of the economic 
value of the patented invention, we believe the law would and should 
recognize such an infringement theory. 
What about acts other than selling and offering to sell the 
invention? In the future, physical instantiations of complex 
mechanical and chemical objects will be a mere press of a button 
away. Does it make sense to conclude that someone has not “made” 
the invention if they have created a digital file? We take this next, 
logical step in Part III and provide a novel exploration of this 
potential. On this point, we offer a new analysis that previous 
literature has not considered. As mentioned, commentators have all 
taken as a given that making the invention requires a physical 
instantiation of the invention. We deconstruct and evaluate that 
assumption and explore why one could view CAD files as direct 
infringement for “making” the claimed invention. Such a rule would 
be an extension of current law, with commensurate potential costs 
that give us pause.29 Part III then concludes with an analysis of direct 
digital infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and shows how 
a novel, but in one sense minor, extension of existing doctrine could 
allow patentees to capture CAD files as equivalents of physical devices. 
In Part IV, we step back to consider the consequences of allowing 
direct digital patent infringement theories. Even if as a technological 
matter there is little difference between digital files and tangible 
objects, there very well may be important policy considerations that 
counsel against such an expansion of patent law. The convergence of 
the digital and physical worlds also alters some of the basic 
presumptions of the patent law regime. As a result, an analysis of 
digital patent infringement under current law is an incomplete 
inquiry; one must also ask whether digital patent infringement is 
desirable in light of the overarching goal to promote the progress of 
the useful arts. Part IV begins the critical conversation that must take 
place if patent law is to absorb DMT optimally. DMT must be analyzed 
in terms of its effects on innovation incentives, follow-on innovation,30 
and laypeople and intermediaries. Finally, Part IV highlights the need 
to appropriately cabin any doctrinal extensions that arise from DMT to 
prevent spillover into other technology areas. 
 
 29 See infra Part IV. 
 30 Follow-on innovation includes innovations that build on earlier innovations. 
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I. DIGITAL MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
DMT continues to evolve and change, but the public has become 
aware of, if not infatuated with, the quintessential DMT: 3D printing. 
3D printing, also called “additive manufacturing,” reverses the normal, 
“subtractive” way most objects have traditionally been built. In 
subtractive processes, one starts with a solid block and then removes 
the undesirable material to yield the desired shape.31 Take sculptures 
as an example: a sculptor starts with a block of marble and begins to 
chip and cut away the stone, ultimately yielding David. Another 
traditional manufacturing method is the use of hollow molds, such as 
where a malleable substance is injected into a mold until the substance 
solidifies.32 The mold is then removed to yield the desired end 
product.33 In contrast to these traditional approaches, 3D printing 
builds objects up layer-by-layer, using a print head that emits a solid 
or molten material to print each layer.34 After a first layer is printed, 
the print head moves up (or the base moves down) and a second layer 
is placed on top of the first layer. The process continues until the 
object is complete. 
To three-dimensionally print, the printer must have instructions.35 
These come from a computer file, which for convenience we refer 
generically to as a CAD file.36 Someone can create a CAD file from 
scratch using a computer program or, alternatively, by scanning an 
existing physical object with a scanner that generates a corresponding 
CAD file.37 Under either scenario, the CAD file is a digital 
representation of the physical object that can be readily printed. 
3D printing is rapidly becoming a mainstream technology and has 
received attention both in the popular press38 and among legal 
 
 31 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 558-59. 
 32 See generally, e.g., Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484, 
486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (discussing patented hollow molding process), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 425 F.2d 1114 (2d. Cir. 1970). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 559. 3D printers can use a 
variety of materials, including plastics, metals, ceramics, and more. Id.; Peter Jensen-
Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the Right to Build 
Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447, 451 (2012). 
 35 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 559. 
 36 Various file formats exist, and currently the most dominant file for 3D printing 
purposes is the STL file. Id. at 559-60. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., The Search for Creative Destruction, GOLDMAN SACHS (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/annual-reports/ 
2013-annual-report-files/search.pdf (describing 3D printing as a disruptive 
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academics.39 3D printers can already make numerous products, 
including shoes,40 human body parts,41 and a working gun.42 3D 
printing even took center stage, figuratively and literally, on the TV 
show Project Runway, when one contestant printed various accessories 
to his fashion designs.43 The technology has and will continue to 
develop rapidly,44 allowing the user to print objects made of multiple 
materials in one pass, such as working circuits.45 
3D printing, however, is not the only form of DMT. Another DMT 
of interest is chemical and biological molecular manufacturing. In 
these processes, a user builds molecules from constituent atoms or 
molecules.46 The concept is similar to 3D printing (and can be 
 
technology); The Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553017 (exploring the future of 3D printing). 
 39 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D 
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014) (discussing the 
potential impacts of 3D printing on the future of patent, copyright, and trademark 
law); Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the 
Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013) (discussing the possible impact of 3D 
printing on the future of products liability law); Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and 
the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811 
(2014) [hereinafter Art and 3D Printing] (discussing 3D printing and its implications 
on laws prohibiting piracy); Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5 (discussing 
the impact of 3D printing on products liability, contract, criminal, intellectual 
property, and environmental law). 
 40 See Michael Fitzgerald, With 3-D Printing, the Shoe Really Fits, MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. (May 15, 2013), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/with-3-d-printing-the-
shoe-really-fits. 
 41 See Dan Solmon, Listening to the Future with a 3D-Printed Ear, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 27, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/27/listening-to-the-future-with-a-3d-
printed-ear. 
 42 See Alexis Kleinman, The First 3D-Printed Gun Has Been Fired, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 6, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/06/3d-
printed-gun-fired_n_3222669.html. 
 43 See Michael Molitch-Hou & Danielle Matich, 3DPI Interview with Project 
Runway Finalist Justin LeBlanc, 3D PRINTING INDUS. (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://3dprintingindustry.com/2013/11/26/3dpi-interview-project-runway-finalist-
justin-leblanc. As an interesting (to us) aside, LeBlanc teaches at NC State University, 
the undergraduate alma mater of one of us and just down the road from the law 
school of the other. 
 44 See HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D PRINTING 
84 (2013). 
 45 See Amit Joe Lopes et al., Integrating Stereolithography and Direct Print 
Technologies for 3D Structural Electronics Fabrication, 18 RAPID PROTOTYPING J. 129, 
129-33 (2012). 
 46 See J.P. Renault et al., Fabricating Arrays of Single Protein Molecules on Glass 
Using Microcontact Printing, 107 J. PHYSICAL CHEM. B 703, 703-04 (2003) (describing a 
microcontact printing method for printing proteins and protein arrays); Press Release, 
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considered a subset of 3D printing) though the scale and print 
materials differ. Although the technology is in its infancy, the goal is 
to manufacture molecules, cells, and systems from digital files akin to 
the CAD files used with 3D printing.47 
Much of the attention paid to DMT technologies has focused on the 
printers themselves.48 As their costs fall,49 printers increasingly will be 
available to everyday users in the same way laser printers went from 
being high-end products to common items found on nearly everyone’s 
desktop.50 What is underappreciated, however, is the CAD files’ 
crucial role in DMT. A CAD file is not merely an impotent blueprint of 
the physical device. Rather, it is a powerful tool that, in a world of 
ubiquitous 3D printers, renders the possessor of the file just as 
satisfied as if he possessed the physical object itself. The physical 
object is merely a button press (and a bit of time and print material) 
away. Such simplicity differs significantly from a blueprint, which 
requires skill to build the described structure. 
By way of analogy, consider a calculator. In years past, a calculator 
connoted a physical object one kept on a desk or in a backpack. 
Today, calculators are simple apps residing on a person’s smart phone. 
Ask someone with a smart phone if she has a calculator, and she says, 
“yes,” even though she only has a file that when loaded into the 
 
Nat’l Sci. Found., Drag-and-Drop DNA (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=125990 (describing technology 
that allows one to “‘print,’ molecule by molecule, exactly the [desired] compound” 
and “to rapidly, and precisely, specify the placement of every atom in a compound”). 
 47 See generally Priscilla E.M. Purnick & Ron Weiss, The Second Wave of Synthetic 
Biology: From Modules to Systems, 10 NATURE REVS. MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 410, 412-
15 (2009) (describing efforts to combine basic biomodules into systems-level circuitry); 
Bioprinting: Printing a Bit of Me, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www. 
economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598322-bioprinting-building-living-tissue-
3d-printer-becoming-new-business (describing computer-controlled 3D printers that 
print live cells); Roff Smith, Just Press Print, NAT’L GEOG., Dec. 2014, at 112, 126 (noting 
use of 3D printing to print blood vessels); Kyle Maxey, 3D Printing Martian DNA?, 
ENGINEERING.COM (Oct. 09, 2013), http://www.engineering.com/3DPrinting/ 
3DPrintingArticles/ArticleID/6443/3D-Printing-Martian-DNA.aspx (discussing potential 
to 3D print synthetic DNA). 
 48 See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 14 (discussing impact of 3D printers on all 
intellectual property); Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39 (focusing on impact of 3D 
printers). 
 49 See Agam Shah, 3D Printer Price Drops Could Lure Home Users, PCWORLD (April 
4, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2140360/3d-printer-price-drops-
could-lure-home-users.html. 
 50 See George Cox, Laser Printer Costs Drop, THE SPECTRUM (Sept. 22, 2014, 5:55 
PM), http://www.thespectrum.com/story/life/features/mesquite/2014/09/22/laser-printer-
costs-drop/16077397/. 
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phone’s RAM gives her the functions of a calculator. It is largely the 
same for one who possesses a CAD file of a physical object: assuming 
you have the print material, a press of the “print” button produces the 
physical object. 
Like MP3 files before them, the impact of CAD files multiplies 
exponentially because of their reproducibility and transferability.51 
Like any other file, they can be copied, emailed, posted online, and 
downloaded from the Internet. The upshot is that one can essentially 
multiply and share physical objects across the globe. This is great 
news for the remote village that can print a replacement part for a 
broken water pump.52 But it is worrisome for the patent holder that 
fears widespread, decentralized creation of her patented invention. 
Just like the digitization of music allowed massive and largely 
anonymous copyright infringement, the digitization of things will be 
of considerable concern to patent holders. 
II. THE OBVIOUS POLICY LEVER: INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT 
The most basic form of infringement under the Patent Act is found 
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which defines infringement as arising when 
someone without authorization makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or 
imports the patented invention.53 Anyone who uses a 3D printer or 
equivalent to print a patented device would be directly infringing 
because she has made the device without authorization. In theory, the 
patent owner could sue such people for patent infringement. 
But such a strategy may be rather impractical. First, given how 
diffuse the printers may be, it may be difficult for the patent owner to 
identify who these infringers are. Second, even if the patent owner 
identifies the infringers — who are probably geographically dispersed 
— the owner may have to sue each infringer separately, either because 
 
 51 Cf. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913 
(2005) (noting that “billions of files” were shared on peer-to-peer networks each 
month); Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and 
Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1471-73, 1475 (2014) (illustrating implications of 
new technology, such as 3D printing, using peer-to-peer MP3 file sharing and noting 
how disruptive MP3 files were to the music industry). 
 52 See J.M. Pearce et al., 3-D Printing of Open Source Appropriate Technologies for 
Self-Directed Sustainable Development, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 17, 18 (2010) (describing 
the possibilities for 3D printers to assist people in developing countries). 
 53 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). There are other forms of direct infringement as well. 
See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of 
Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Consequences of 
Akamai] (discussing § 271(e)–(g)). 
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of joinder rules54 or personal jurisdiction requirements.55 Finally, the 
patent owner would ultimately be suing a potential customer, 
someone who may want to buy the patented item. The music industry 
faced this scenario when illegal digital music downloads began.56 
Ultimately, the industry did sue illegal downloaders, or at least those 
engaged in massive downloads, to set an example.57 Such a strategy, 
however, may not be effective, and it risks alienating future customers 
and creating a public relations nightmare.58 
To combat some of these problems, patent law affords protection to 
patent owners against indirect infringement, which arises when a third 
party is held liable for the acts of others who are directly infringing the 
patent.59 Holding such indirect infringers liable helps to protect patent 
owners when the direct infringers may be large in number, diffuse, 
and perhaps unable to pay.60 The Patent Act provides two forms of 
indirect infringement: active inducement of infringement under § 
271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c).61 Active 
inducement is vaguely defined in the statute, though it is clear 
Congress intended to codify the common law that had developed prior 
to the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act.62 With respect to DMT, one 
could consider the printer to be the genesis of the potential indirect 
liability, since it ultimately produces the patented invention.63 Thus, 
 
 54 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). For an excellent discussion of the new joinder 
provisions, see generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 
(2013). 
 55 For a leading case interpreting personal jurisdiction, see Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 56 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 725-29. 
 57 Copyright owners had the subpoena power under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) that allowed them easily to identify downloaders via their 
ISP address. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2012). This power is specific to copyright owners 
and would not be available to patent owners, further complicating the ability of a 
patent owner to sue persons printing their invention directly. In addition, courts have 
read § 512(h) such that it does not apply to files located on peer-to-peer networks. See 
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 58 See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 
2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. 
 59 Id. at 401. 
 60 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA 
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 400-01 (2006) [hereinafter Induced Infringement]. 
 61 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2012). 
 62 See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent 
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006). 
 63 See Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1496 (discussing indirect liability based on 3D 
printers). 
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patent owners may want to go after the manufacturers of the printers 
as indirect infringers. This avenue, however, would not bear fruit for 
patent owners. Both forms of indirect infringement require knowledge 
of the relevant patent. Because 3D printers are generic — they print 
whatever the CAD file tells them to print — it is highly unlikely the 
manufacturers of the printers would ever be liable for indirect 
infringement. 
The CAD files, however, are quite different. These files are specific 
to a particular item and thus potentially to a specific patented 
invention. Indirect infringement theories are the most obvious avenue 
for patentees under current law because they do not turn on the 
difficult question of whether the CAD file itself infringes the patent 
covering the physical invention. Instead, liability arises for a party 
when she facilitates the infringement of someone else, such as when a 
third party makes an infringing item from the CAD file.64 Webpages 
already exist where people can buy CAD files or download them for 
free.65 Just as in the digital music context, people can use peer-to-peer 
networks to share files66 that they have either purchased or created on 
their own.67 
It is thus unsurprising that the majority of commentators to analyze 
whether digital files can infringe patent claims have focused almost 
exclusively on indirect infringement theories. Indeed, these 
commentators simply assume without discussion that direct 
infringement lawsuits based on the CAD files alone are not viable.68 In 
this section, we too address the possibility for indirect infringement 
based on CAD files. Our analysis reveals complexities not yet 
discussed in the literature. As we explain, patent holders likely will be 
dissatisfied with indirect infringement claims against digital files. 
Nevertheless, as we address in Part III, we do not join those previous 
 
 64 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 400 (“Liability for active 
inducement of infringement and contributory infringement are variations of third-
party liability, where one party is held liable for the directly infringing acts of 
others.”). 
 65 See, e.g., 3D BURRITO, http://3dburrito.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2014); 
THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
 66 Ernesto, Pirate Bay Takes over Distribution of Censored 3D Printable Gun, 
TORRENTFREAK (May 10, 2013), https://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-takes-over-distribution-
of-censored-3d-printable-gun-130510.  
 67 This is another significant difference from the copyright context. Where most of 
the music and movie files had to be copied from the original copyrighted work, people 
can sometimes generate CAD files by scanning an object, and they may not be aware 
that the object is patented or part of a patented item. 
 68 See supra note 18. 
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commentators who have rejected the possibility of direct infringement 
claims based on the CAD files themselves. 
Claims for indirect infringement could arise in at least two common 
scenarios. First, an individual could create69 or otherwise obtain a 
digital file and transfer that file directly or indirectly to someone who 
prints the infringing physical object. Second, a website, peer-to-peer 
network, or other network could host a digital file, allowing others to 
access the file and print the infringing object. We explore these 
scenarios as we discuss patent law’s two forms of indirect 
infringement: active inducement of infringement and contributory 
infringement. 
A. Active Inducement of Infringement Under § 271(b) 
A person is liable as an indirect infringer when she “actively induces 
infringement.”70 To prove active inducement, a patent holder must 
demonstrate the following elements: (1) direct infringement; (2) 
specific intent to induce a third party to infringe; and (3) an 
affirmative act by the inducer.71 
As will be shown, digital infringement creates unique problems for a 
patent holder’s ability to enforce its patent through active inducement. 
First, the patentee must prove that the alleged inducement actually 
led to an act of direct infringement.72 In the context of 3D printing, for 
example, the patentee would have to show by direct or circumstantial 
evidence that the accused inducer provided access to a CAD file that 
 
 69 Either by scanning an object or designing it from scratch on a computer. 
 70 See 35 U.S.C. §271(b) (2012). 
 71 See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT 
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 452 (West 4th ed. 2013). 
 72 See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 
(2014) (“This case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for 
inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly 
infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision. The statutory 
text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in the 
negative.”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42 
(1961) (“[T]here can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct 
infringement.”); i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“To succeed on a theory of contributory or induced infringement, [the patent 
owner] was required to show direct infringement of the . . . patent.”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (2011); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Upon a failure of proof of direct infringement, any claim of 
inducement of infringement also fails. A finding of contributory infringement likewise 
requires underlying proof of direct infringement.” (citation omitted)); Joy Techs., Inc. 
v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
  
1336 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1319 
another person downloaded and printed.73 Proving this kind of direct 
infringement can be difficult because of the relative anonymity of the 
internet. Discovering who has downloaded a file often requires a 
difficult and lengthy discovery process, as shown by digital music 
litigation.74 Moreover, in copyright law, the mere act of downloading 
the song is an act of infringement. Under current understanding of 
patent law,75 the act of direct infringement would be the printing of 
the patented item, constituting an infringing “making” of the patented 
invention.76 As such, the patentee must prove that the downloader 
actually printed the object. Although obtaining such proof is not 
impossible, it certainly can be difficult and costly.77 The patentee’s 
burden may be lightened somewhat because it can prove the 
underlying direct infringement with circumstantial evidence.78 What 
 
 73 But see Finnsugar Bioproducts, Inc. v. Raytheon Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 
No. 97 C 8746, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15965, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that 
claims for contributory infringement based on an offer to sell need not show that the 
actual sale has occurred and that the patentee meets the “direct infringement pleading 
requirement by pleading that a sale will occur sometime in the future”). Without 
directly citing Finnsugar, the Federal Circuit has abrogated it. See In re Bill of Lading 
Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“[Plaintiff] is incorrect that a party could be liable for contributory 
infringement even if no one has yet directly infringed the patent in question.”). 
 74 See Sean B. Karunaratne, Note, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy 
Through Mass John Doe Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 111 MICH. L. REV. 283, 286-88 
(2012) (describing the process of obtaining IP addresses, filing “John Doe” lawsuits on 
the basis of the addresses, and then seeking subpoenas to discover the person behind 
the IP address). 
 75 An understanding that we challenge below. 
 76 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 77 One way to determine the identity would be for the patentee to determine an IP 
address that was used to download a file. See Karunaratne, supra note 74, at 286-88. 
Using that IP address, the patentee would file a John Doe lawsuit to determine the true 
identity of the downloader. See id. at 287. Then the patentee would need to somehow 
prove that the person who downloaded the file actually printed it, either through an 
admission or some other avenue, thereby making the invention pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a). 
 78 Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (vacating summary judgment in part based on circumstantial evidence of direct 
infringement); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (finding no clear error in the district court’s finding that the patentee “had met 
its burden of showing infringement under section 271(b) with circumstantial evidence 
of extensive puzzle sales, dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the method of 
restoring the preselected pattern with each puzzle, and the availability of a solution 
booklet on how to solve the puzzle”). 
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constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence, however, is uncertain,79 
especially in the uncharted arena of CAD files. 
Second, the accused inducer must also have the requisite mental 
state — the intent to induce acts of infringement.80 This intent 
element requires actual knowledge of the patent or willful blindness of 
the patent’s existence.81 Assuming the patentee can prove the 
underlying act of direct infringement, she also must prove the accused 
inducer actively encouraged the direct infringer with “knowledge that 
 
 79 The courts have struggled with how to prove infringement through 
circumstantial evidence, particularly with respect to software-implemented inventions. 
For example, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the holding of no direct infringement where the accused software method was only 
used by the media player when the primary, non-infringing method failed. 543 F.3d 
710, 723 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The patentee “did not show specific instances of direct 
infringement” where the infringing software method had actually run, but instead 
relied on expert testimony that the failure of the non-infringing method was “very 
common.” Id. Similarly, in ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturing Co., the 
court confronted the situation where the accused device could be operated in either of 
two modes, one infringing and one not. 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The 
court found no infringement, reasoning “to prove direct infringement, a patentee must 
either point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the accused 
device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.” Id. 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of direct infringement in Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. See 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub 
nom. Microsoft Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). In Lucent, the 
accused software method required a user of a computer program, such as Microsoft 
Office, to utilize the patented date-picker function instead of the non-patented typing 
method. Id. Despite no specific evidence of an individual act of infringement, the court 
affirmed the holding of infringement because “circumstantial evidence was just 
adequate to permit a jury to find that at least one other person within the United 
States during the relevant time period, other than the expert, had performed the 
claimed method,” noting that the accused indirect infringer included instructions to 
customers regarding how to use both the infringing and non-infringing methods. Id. 
Because CAD files may have uses other than merely printing, these cases suggest 
courts may require evidence of specific acts of direct infringement. Undeniably, issues 
of what evidence, particularly circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to prove direct 
infringement will arise in litigation. 
 80 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) 
(“Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires 
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”); see also DSU Med. 
Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) 
(“[I]nducement requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging 
another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct 
infringer’s activities.”). 
 81 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69. To show willful blindness, a patentee must 
demonstrate “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high 
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to 
avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 2070. 
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the induced acts constitute[d] patent infringement.”82 This necessarily 
means that the accused inducer has knowledge of the patent. 
This scienter requirement significantly limits the ability of patent 
owners to sue actors for active inducement. For instance, CAD file 
creators may be unsophisticated actors, unfamiliar with patents and 
patent law.83 Patent law, thus far, has not had to wrestle much with 
laypeople as accused inducers. Before DMT, the quintessential inducer 
was a relatively wealthy company that had access to sophisticated legal 
counsel.84 Now, accused inducers will include passive websites hosting 
CAD files and numerous individuals who transfer files to others.85 In 
essence, indirect infringement will enter an era of unsophisticated (in 
a patent law sense) inducers, which raises significant new legal and 
policy issues. 
The copyright system, of course, has encountered some of this 
dynamic with infringing digital downloads. The Supreme Court even 
imported active inducement from patent law into the copyright system 
in Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.86 But, in Grokster, 
the requisite intent was apparent. As the Supreme Court noted, each of 
the defendant’s entire existence was about facilitating the peer-to-peer 
transfer of copyrighted works.87 Indeed, the Court concluded, “[t]he 
unlawful objective is unmistakable.”88 The result is not surprising 
given that everyone effectively knows music is subject to copyright. 
The situation differs significantly in the patent context because 
people often have little to no appreciation that objects are patented. 
The strict knowledge requirement will make it difficult for patentees 
 
 82 See id. at 2068. 
 83 The actual manufacturers of 3D printers and scanners likely are sophisticated 
actors, but they also likely would not satisfy the knowledge requirement given that, in 
theory, every patent that involves a material object could arguably be created by a 3D 
printer. It is unlikely they would be viewed as even being willfully ignorant in that 
context. Willful ignorance, which is a form of knowledge, is more particularized than 
general knowledge that a patent out there, somewhere, may cover the produced item. 
See id. at 2070. 
 84 Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2011) (“Accused inducers of infringement are not individuals and 
small companies but giant, multi-national corporations.”). 
 85 For an example of a website that hosts user-generated content for others to 
share, see THINGIVERSE, supra note 65. 
 86 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005); see also 
Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 402-04 (discussing Grokster and its 
relationship to patent law). 
 87 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937-40. 
 88 Id. at 940. 
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to hold inducers liable.89 If the accused inducer independently created 
the infringing object and did not know of the patent, there will 
obviously be no knowledge on the part of the accused inducer. Even if 
the accused inducer copies an object that is marked with a patent 
number product, the mere marking of a product — unnoticed by the 
inducer — is not sufficient to impute knowledge.90 At a minimum, 
patent owners will need to police activities more rigorously and likely 
send various notice letters to trigger the requisite knowledge on the 
part of many lay infringers.91 
Even after an accused inducer has actual notice of a patent, her 
“good faith” belief that the patent is invalid or that the printed item 
does not infringe the patent negates the requisite intent, immunizing 
them from liability92 (at least for past infringement).93 Thus, sending 
 
 89 Some accused inducers might plausibly argue that although they transferred the 
CAD file, they did not intend for it to be printed, thus negating the intent to infringe. 
 90 This is true even when the accused is a business rather than an individual. See 
Mendenhall v. Astec Indus., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1134, 1137 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) 
(“While [the patentee] argued vigorously . . . that the word ‘knowingly’ as used in 
[Section 271(c)] included constructive knowledge of the patent, it was unable to 
produce any case law to support that position.”), aff’d per curium, 891 F.2d 299 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989); Celotex Corp. v. V.E. Power Door Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 636, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979) (rejecting an argument that constructive knowledge of a patent is sufficient and 
stating that, under Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 
476 (1964), and stating “there can be no question that . . . actual knowledge is 
required under § 271(c)”). Contra Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 796 
(assuming that “any deliberate copying, rendering, or 3D scanning of a product 
marked with a United States patent number should suffice” to show scienter). 
 91 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-90 
(1964) (stating that receipt of letter from patentee alleging infringement was sufficient 
to impute knowledge of the patent and infringement). 
 92 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“We now hold that evidence of an accused inducer’s good-faith belief of [patent] 
invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.”). The Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari in this case on the question of whether a defendant’s 
belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 
271(b). See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 752, 752 (2014); see also 
Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that a 
reasonable belief of non-infringement supported a jury verdict that the defendant 
lacked the intent required for induced infringement); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 
F.3d 1293, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding a demonstrated belief of non-infringement 
sufficient to support a jury verdict that the defendant did not induce infringement). 
 93 Arguably, during litigation, if the patent is found not invalid and infringed, then 
that belief has been negated. The accused inducer should be enjoined from inducing 
ongoing infringing activity, or to pay an ongoing royalty rate. See Holbrook, Induced 
Infringement, supra note 60, at 406 (“The shield from liability would only be 
retrospective, however. The indirect infringer should not be immunized from 
prospective relief if her belief is later shown to be unfounded at trial.”); see also 
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notice letters may result in the accused obtaining such an opinion of 
counsel, further complicating enforcement. A legitimate opinion of 
counsel opining that the patent is invalid or not infringed would 
certainly provide “good faith” sufficient to avoid inducement.94 But 
opinions of counsel are expensive, and laypeople may not even know 
they need one or how to get one. Thus, the question remains, what is 
the scope of good faith in the absence of legal counsel? 
Suppose that a layperson with actual notice of a patent studies it 
closely but erroneously concludes without advice of counsel that it is 
invalid or not infringed. Is “good faith” purely a subjective inquiry 
into the mind of the accused, or is there an objective element?95 Does 
the answer differ depending on whether the infringer is a layperson or 
a business?96 Before 3D printing and other DMT, the vast majority of 
 
Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1603 n.162. 
 94 See Bettcher Indus. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 649 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(finding opinion of counsel regarding non-infringement “admissible, at least with 
respect to [defendant]’s state of mind and its bearing on indirect infringement”). 
 95 Professor Rantanen, in his excellent exploration of fault in the indirect 
infringement context, points to Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 
(Fed. Cir. 1988), as suggesting that the Federal Circuit applies an objective 
component to the intent to induce inquiry. Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1621. He 
states, “the Federal Circuit concluded that despite a letter evidencing the accused 
indirect infringer’s subjective belief that his composition did not infringe the patent, 
the objective evidence . . . supported the [judge’s] conclusion that such a belief was 
objectively unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Professor Rantanen overstates his point slightly. The court did not clearly adopt an 
objective component for intent; it was reviewing a lower decision for clear error. It is 
an equally fair reading of the case that the court allowed the district court to use “all 
of the circumstances” — including objective evidence — to decide whether it believed 
the defendant as to asserted subjective belief. See Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668-69 
(stating that the defendant’s evidence was “not such clear evidence of intent that the 
district court could not make a contrary finding” and “[t]he requisite intent to induce 
infringement may be inferred from all of the circumstances”). 
 96 Support for such a distinction can be found in the original version of Article 1 
of the U.C.C., which embraced a distinction between sophisticated actors 
(“merchants” under U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2000)) and mere laypeople (non-merchants) 
regarding what constitutes good faith. Good faith for non-merchants meant only 
subjective good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000) (defining good faith for non-
merchants as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”). Good faith 
for merchants required subjective and objective good faith. Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (2001) 
(defining good faith for merchants as “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”). The revised Article 1 of 
the U.C.C. abolished the subjective-only test for non-merchants. See id. § 1-
201(b)(20) (2001). However, many states either have not adopted revised Article 1 or 
have adopted it without that particular change. Keith A. Rowley, UCC Legislative 
Update, UCC LAW (Mar. 2, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://ucclaw.blogspot.com/2010/03/ucc-
legislative-update.html (“Of the 37 enacting states, 26 have adopted the uniform 
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inducing infringers were large companies,97 but DMT potentially will 
expose numerous individuals to accusations of inducement. A purely 
subjective test would render enforcement exceedingly difficult because 
patent law is so esoteric and specialized that a layperson could 
innocently misunderstand — or plausibly assert that he 
misunderstood — the law any number of ways.98 Even if the test has 
an objective element, if it is tied to what a reasonable layperson might 
understand, patent law’s complexity could effectively insulate many 
laypeople from inducement.99 
Although there is some uncertainty as to whether the test for actual 
knowledge of infringement will be objective or subjective (though we 
believe it is subjective), it is clear that where willful blindness is used 
to show knowledge, a subjective test is used. The Supreme Court has 
recently stated that willful blindness requires a threshold finding that 
the accused inducer first subjectively believes there is a high 
probability of infringement.100 Proving such a mindset will be difficult. 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit, in the comparable context of willful 
infringement, has suggested that a layperson’s subjective views will 
not negate intent.101 When someone knows of a patent and infringes 
 
definition, while 11 have retained the pre-revised definition.”). 
 97 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1580.  
 98 See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 72, 119 (2012) (“[T]he only parties that are liable for inducing such infringement 
are those that have actively engaged in the patent system and have awareness of the 
patent and a belief that the activity they are inducing is infringing. Such actors must be 
quite familiar with the patent system and law to form such an intent.” (emphasis 
added)). Indirect infringement focuses on the actor’s appreciation of the legal (as 
opposed to factual) consequences of a given act. See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1617-
20. And a layperson will be virtually helpless to make those determinations accurately. 
Determining the merit of a claim for patent infringement is generally much more 
difficult in the patent context than the copyright context. The accused inducer must 
wrestle with claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents, and obviousness, among 
other difficult areas of patent law. What chance does a layperson have of construing 
claims correctly if district courts cannot do so a large percentage of the time? See, e.g., 
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (reporting the reversal rate for 
appealed claim terms from 1996 to 2003 was 34.5%). 
 99 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1615 (“But the only way to actually know that 
conduct infringes a patent is to interpret the claims and conduct in an infringement 
analysis. Even then, one cannot be ‘practically certain’ that conduct infringes a patent 
— the only way to know for sure is to have a court make a final determination.”). 
 100 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011). 
 101 See generally In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (“The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective 
inquiry.”). 
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anyway, she may be viewed as a willful patent infringer.102 When 
infringement is willful, a court can enhance damages up to treble the 
compensatory amount.103 To prove willful infringement, the patent 
owner must demonstrate: (1) “that the infringer acted despite an 
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of 
a valid patent”; and (2) “that this objectively-defined risk (determined 
by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either 
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 
infringer.”104 The second prong of the willfulness test contains an 
objective requirement, namely, that the infringer “should have 
known” of the risk. Thus, for willful infringement, a mere subjective 
belief of non-infringement will not negate intent. If the infringer has a 
good faith belief that the patent claim is invalid or not infringed, then 
generally there is no willful infringement.105 This belief negates the 
required scienter for willful infringement just as it does for induced 
 
 102 See generally id. (creating an “objective recklessness” standard for willful 
infringement, in which a reckless person is one who knows of an unjustifiably high 
risk of harm and acts anyway). 
 103 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed.”). 
 104 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. The continued vitality of this test for willfulness is in 
doubt. The Supreme Court recently rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for fee-shifting 
when a case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756-58 (2014); see also Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748-49 (2014) (rejecting de novo 
review of exceptional case determination in light of new standard). Given the link 
between fee-shifting in § 285 and the enhancement of damages under § 284, two 
Federal Circuit judges have called for the court to reconsider Seagate. See Halo Elecs., 
Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383-86 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., 
concurring, joined by Hughes, J.). The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court, 
therefore, may change the Seagate standard. 
 105 See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“Thus a competent opinion of counsel concluding either that DirecTV did not 
infringe the ’505 patent or that it was invalid would provide a sufficient basis for 
DirecTV to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless behavior.”); Wechsler v. 
Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A primary 
consideration for willful infringement, on the other hand, is whether the infringer had 
a good faith belief that the patent was invalid and/or not infringed.”); Jurgens v. CBK, 
Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]here one continues his infringing 
activity, and fails to investigate and determine, in good faith, that he possesses 
reasonable defenses to an accusation of patent infringement, the infringement is in 
bad faith. Such conduct occurs when an infringer merely copies a patented invention, 
or where he obtains incompetent, conclusory opinions of counsel only to use as a 
shield against a later charge of willful infringement, rather than in a good faith attempt 
to avoid infringing another’s patent.”). 
  
2015] Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing 1343 
infringement.106 But this belief must be based on a competent opinion 
of counsel, suggesting that there is an objective aspect to this 
inquiry.107 If the Federal Circuit follows the willfulness doctrine’s 
objective requirement, it will require lay inducers to seek sophisticated 
opinions of counsel.108 
Finally, the third element for inducement requires that the accused 
inducer actively induced infringement.109 The Supreme Court has 
stated that “[t]he term ‘induce’ means ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to 
prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.’ The addition of the 
adverb ‘actively’ suggests that the inducement must involve the taking 
of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result.”110 
It seems clear that the inducer needs to have transferred or hosted 
the CAD file with the specific intent that it be printed,111 but it is not 
 
 106 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 405-06 (comparing 
willfulness and inducement); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 UC 
DAVIS L. REV. 225, 240 n.70 (2005) [hereinafter Inducing Patent Infringement]. 
 107 See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting 
that willfulness can still be found when opinion of counsel is incompetent). For 
example, the Federal Circuit offered the following explanation in Golden Blount, Inc. v. 
Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006): 
The district court did not clearly err in dismissing Peterson’s asserted good-faith 
belief in non-infringement, and thus in finding willfulness. Peterson made little-
to-no effort to assess whether it infringed or whether the patent was invalid 
after receiving notice of the patent. The district court did not clearly err in 
according little weight to the first two oral opinions rendered by McLaughlin in 
light of the fact that McLaughlin did not have, and therefore could not have 
considered, the prosecution history or the accused device when the opinions 
were given . . . . Finally, the district court did not clearly err in inferring that 
Peterson demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward Golden Blount’s patent rights 
from the facts that Peterson did not respond substantively to Golden Blount’s 
notice letters and that it only sought a thorough opinion of counsel after suit 
was filed, and then only out of a concern to avoid a willfulness finding and a 
possible judgment for attorney fees. 
 108 That said, the standard for willfulness differs somewhat from the inducement 
context. To prove willfulness, the patent owner must show “that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a 
valid patent” and that “that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record 
developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 109 See MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 71, at 452. 
 110 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011). 
 111 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc as 
to Section III.B of the opinion) (holding en banc that inducement requires that the 
alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed “specific intent” to 
encourage another’s infringement). 
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clear what is required to show the specific intent. For example, must 
the inducer have taken an “affirmative step” beyond merely uploading 
or transferring the file, such as urging that the file be printed? 
Although a person often hosts or transfers a CAD file so that it can be 
printed, that may not be true every time. Someone might share a file 
simply so others could view the digital version, or so that people in 
countries where the object is not patented could print it. What if 
someone posts a CAD file with a large disclaimer reading: “Do not 
print in any country where printing will infringe a patent!”? Will such 
a disclaimer protect the accused inducer from liability? Or, instead, 
would the negative command actually suggest to the direct infringer 
that they should print.112 In other words, metaphorically, does a sign 
saying “don’t push the button” actually lead people to push the 
button? 
Due to these various legal and practical limitations, patent owners 
will have considerable difficulty using active inducement of patent 
infringement under § 271(b) to stop or prevent the distribution of 
CAD files. Although active inducement is designed to protect patent 
owners in the context of diffuse infringement, we believe that patent 
owners likely will need to pursue some other avenue. 
B. Contributory Infringement Under § 271(c) 
Active inducement under § 271(b) is not the only form of indirect 
infringement under the patent statute. When Congress adopted 
§ 271(b) and (c), it codified common law that had developed. Section 
271(c) represented the most common form of indirect infringement113 
 
 112 Cf. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 
1312-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding a genuine issue of material fact around the accused 
inducer’s specific intent because defendant’s “field bulletins” instructed users to 
configure the device in a non-infringing manner, but an employee of the defendant 
testified that he instructed users to configure the device however “they feel 
comfortable,” which might involve an infringing configuration); Lifescan, Inc. v. Can-
Am Care Corp., 859 F. Supp. 392, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding a genuine issue of 
material fact existed regarding inducement because the “fact that [the accused] 
provides the warning [against configuring in an infringing manner] to consumers does 
not equate with the fact that the consumers, in fact, understand and heed the 
warning”). 
 113 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 (“Cases in the latter category — i.e., cases in 
which a party sold an item that was not itself covered by the claims of a patent but 
that enabled another party to make or use a patented machine, process, or 
combination — were more common.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 
909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The most common pre-1952 contributory 
infringement cases dealt with the situation where a seller would sell a component 
which was not itself technically covered by the claims of a product or process patent 
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and § 271(b) covered all other forms.114 Thus, the two provisions, 
though distinct, are related.115 
A person is liable for contributory infringement when the following 
conditions are satisfied: (1) someone offers to sell, sells, or imports 
into the United States (2) a component of a patented device (3) 
knowing the component to be especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of a patent with no substantial non-infringing uses (4) 
resulting in an act of direct infringement.116 
Unlike active inducement under § 271(b), there is no requirement 
that the infringer have an “intent to cause infringement.” Instead, the 
law requires knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the 
component is especially adapted for the patent.117 Because the accused 
contributory infringer is aware of the patent and that the component 
has no substantial non-infringing uses, intent is presumed — what 
other use could the component have except to infringe?118 Thus, the 
two provisions differ because one can be an active inducer of 
infringement even if some acts could be non-infringing, as was the 
case in the analogous copyright scenario in Grokster.119 
The first requirement — that someone sell, offer to sell, or import a 
component — bears further exploration. Commentators discussing 
§ 271(c) in the context of CAD files have focused their attention on 
whether the CAD file is a “component.”120 But an additional, 
 
but which had no other use except with the claimed product or process.”). 
 114 Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (“Section 271(b) codified the prohibition 
against all other types of activity which, prior to 1952, had constituted ‘contributory 
infringement.’”); see Adams, supra note 62, at 370; Lemley, Inducing Patent 
Infringement, supra note 106, at 227. 
 115 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065-68 (using § 271(c) precedent to interpret 
§ 271(b)). 
 116 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). In addition, the component must be a material 
part of the invention, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use. Id. 
 117 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) 
(“On this question a majority of the Court is of the view that [§] 271(c) does require a 
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which 
his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.”). 
 118 See Holbrook, Induced Infringement, supra note 60, at 408. 
 119 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005). 
 120 See, e.g., Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 796-800 (arguing that CAD 
files are not “components” under § 271(c)); cf. William R. Thornewell II, Note, Patent 
Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f) to Software and “Virtual Components,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2833-43 
(2005) (analyzing the potential judicial treatment of CAD files as “components” under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). 
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unexplored question is how to interpret the requirement that the 
infringer “sells” or “offers to sell” the component. The Federal Circuit 
has interpreted “offer to sell” under § 271(a) “according to the norms 
of traditional contractual analysis,”121 meaning that an offer must 
constitute a “manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so 
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to 
that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”122 The Federal Circuit’s 
contract-law definition for an “offer” has been criticized.123 Part of the 
criticism relates to the definition’s exclusion of most advertisements 
and solicitations,124 which can cause harm to the patentee in the form 
of price erosion.125 
Importantly, the Federal Circuit has held that the term “sale” 
excludes at least some transactions where the infringing item is 
donated or otherwise given away for free.126 Although this 
interpretation may be correct as a matter of plain meaning, the fact 
 
 121 Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 122 Id. at 1257 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)). 
 123 See, e.g., Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92 (criticizing the 
Federal Circuit’s contract-law offer standard for, among other things, failing to 
account for price erosion from advertisements of infringing products); Lucas S. 
Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” as a Policy Tool in Patent Law and 
Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143, 169-91, 196-99 (2013) [hereinafter Offer to Sell] 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s contract-law offer standard for failing to account for 
price erosion and for failing to properly interpret the statutory language and relevant 
Supreme Court case law). 
 124 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 798-99; Osborn, Offer to Sell, 
supra note 123, at 150. 
 125 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92 (indicating that the 
damage to the patentee is the lost profit caused by the drop in price because but for 
the infringing offer to sell, the patentee could have sold the item at a higher price); cf. 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 
F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “the damages that would flow from 
an unaccepted offer to sell and an actual sale would likely be quite different” (citing 
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 791-92)). Price erosion refers to the 
downward price pressure on patented goods when a competitor signals to the market 
that it will offer a competing (often infringing) good, since the market expects the 
patentee to lower its price to compete with the infringer. See Osborn, Offer to Sell, 
supra note 123, at 174-76. 
 126 HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding, 
in the personal jurisdiction context, that “a mere offer to donate, where a donation is 
never made, cannot be an offer for sale” under § 271(a)); see also Holbrook, Threat of 
a Sale, supra note 9, at 766. That said, some efforts to give something away for “free” 
may nevertheless be a “sale” because some sort of consideration is exchanged. Cf. 
LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(finding patent rights exhausted under “first sale” doctrine even though item was 
distributed for free). 
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that non-commercial transfers of CAD files may not be actionable as 
“sales” creates a barrier to lawsuits based on contributory 
infringement. Because generating CAD files can be inexpensive, CAD 
file creators may be willing to transfer them without charging money. 
Similarly, websites will be willing to host the CAD files without 
charging for them. Yet the availability of the CAD files can harm the 
patentee in the form of lost sales127 and price erosion. Under current 
interpretation, these harms cannot be rectified because transferring 
CAD files for free would not constitute a sale or offer to sell under 
§ 271(c).128 
The second requirement — that the sale or offer to sell must be for a 
“component” of the patented invention — adds additional complexity 
to the issue. In the end, we conclude that a CAD file that will print the 
finished product is not a component of the finished product. But we 
explore the counterargument in the remainder of this section. At the 
outset, it should be noted that attempting to pigeonhole a CAD file as 
a “component” of the underlying physical device differs from the 
normal contributory infringement case. In the majority of early 
contributory infringement cases, the alleged “component” was a 
physical piece of the larger patented whole. For example, for a 
patented blender comprising a motor-driven base and a container, the 
container would represent a component of the patented blender. Even 
in this era of intangible inventions, contributory infringement 
continues to play an important role. For example, many software-
related inventions are claimed as methods, and courts consider the 
software functionality — such as an XML editor — to be a component 
of the method of editing an XML document.129 
But if a CAD file is a “component” of the patented physical device, it 
certainly relates to the physical device in a manner distinct from prior 
cases. Unlike the container that is physically part of the blender 
invention, the CAD file is not part of the physical device. In fact, it is a 
 
 127 Of course, not every CAD file that is obtained for free would have been the 
subject of a sale — many people who are willing to obtain the CAD file for free would 
be unwilling to pay the market price for the CAD file. 
 128 See HollyAnne, 199 F.3d at 1309 n.7 (“Arguably, even numerous offers to 
donate could not be considered an infringing act under section 271(a) because 
Congress made offers to sell infringing acts and not offers to donate, despite the 
obvious commercial uses of a donation.”). 
 129 See i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 848-49 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 
1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that various software products, including Microsoft 
Outlook, contributorily infringed a patented method concerning a calendar date-
picker function). 
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digital representation of the entire device, not merely a part. 
Additionally, once the CAD file is printed, the file continues to exist 
separate and apart from the physical device, and the physical device no 
longer needs the CAD file for its existence. We do not, for instance, 
call the assembly line from which traditional devices are manufactured 
“components” of the device. More naturally, we might call the CAD 
file a precursor to the physical object or analogize it to a mold from 
which the object is formed. 
Yet analogies to traditional manufacturing techniques, in which the 
manufacturer was a big company with deep pockets, are not entirely 
helpful in a digital manufacturing era. The doctrine of contributory 
infringement arose to protect patentees from the harm done to them 
when another party commercializes the patentee’s technology.130 In 
the past, we think the law did not consider a mold or an assembly line 
to be a “component” of the patented device because doing so was 
unnecessary to protect the patentee’s interest. The company using the 
mold was likely a large, centralized business committing massive 
infringement with assets to pay a large infringement judgment.131 In 
contrast, the entities using the CAD files are likely to be decentralized, 
individualized actors who might be guilty of a single act of 
infringement when they print the item. Suing each of them is not 
practical or cost effective.132 Hence, whereas a plain meaning of 
“component” does not encompass a CAD file, a purposive 
interpretation of the term very well might. 
Courts addressing CAD files would not be writing on an entirely 
clean slate, however. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,133 the Supreme 
Court analyzed the term “component” in § 271(f) of the Patent Act,134 
which is written to parallel active inducement and contributory 
infringement.135 Thus, the interpretation afforded to “component” in 
 
 130 See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (finding 
contributory infringement where the defendant made and sold the burner of a 
patented burner/chimney combination “for the express purpose of assisting, and 
making profit by assisting, in a gross infringement of the complainants’ patent”). 
 131 See Rantanen, supra note 84, at 1580. 
 132 See Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (noting that without contributory infringement, 
“the complainants would be driven to the task of searching out the individual 
purchasers for use who actually place the chimney on the burner and use it — a 
consequence which, considering the small value of each separate lamp, and the 
trouble and expense of prosecution, would make the complainants helpless and 
remediless”). 
 133 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 134 See id. (discussing whether software qualifies as a “component” under § 271(f)). 
 135 Michael Silhasek, Comment, Closing One Loophole and Opening Another: Why 
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the context of § 271(f) should also inform that term’s meaning in § 
271(c). Section 271(f)(1) and (2) track the language of § 271(b) and 
(c).136 Infringement under § 271(f)(1) arises when a party “actively 
induce[s] the combination” of the invention’s components outside of 
the United States “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States.”137 A party infringes 
under § 271(f)(2) when: 
[She] supplies or causes to be supplied . . . any component of a 
patented invention that is especially made or especially 
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use . . . knowing that such component is so made or adapted 
and intending that such component will be combined outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent 
if such combination occurred within the United States.138 
An obvious difference between § 271(b) and (c), on the one hand, and 
§271(f), on the other, is that §271(f) is an extraterritorial provision that 
concerns the exportation of either the unassembled components of a 
claimed invention or components that have no substantial non-infringing 
uses.139 Nevertheless, the language of § 271(f) should be interpreted 
consistently with § 271(c), given that the same language is used. 
In Microsoft, the arguable “component” was software that was sent 
overseas to be loaded onto computers there.140 AT&T’s patent covered 
a computer/software combination for digitally encoding and 
compressing recorded speech.141 Because the patent claim required the 
 
§ 271(f) Patent Infringement Should Apply to Method Patents After Cardiac Pacemakers, 
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 700 (2011) (“[T]he application of § 271(f) should parallel 
the application of the inducement and contributory infringement statutes.”); see 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118 (2014) (using 
§ 271(f)(1) to inform analysis of § 271(b)); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., 
Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in relevant part) (interpreting 
§ 271(f)(2) in light of § 271(c)). But see Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 
1338, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing § 271(b) and § 271(f)(1), but noting 
“because § 271(f)(1) lacks such a strict liability companion statute, comparisons to 
§ 271(b) are of limited value”). 
 136 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1334 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk, 
J., dissenting) (“The language of section 271(f) itself mimics the language of the 
indirect infringement provisions of sections 271(b) and (c).”). 
 137 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012). 
 138 Id. § 271(f)(2). 
 139 See id. § 271(f)(1)–(2). 
 140 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). 
 141 Id. at 441-42. 
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combination of computer and software, neither a computer standing 
alone nor the software standing alone (e.g., on a compact disk or other 
pure storage medium) directly infringed the claims. Instead, direct 
infringement only occurred when the software was loaded onto the 
computer.142 Microsoft transported its enabling software out of the 
United States to a foreign country where it was then copied, and the 
copy was then combined with a computer.143 
The Court’s analysis first focused on § 271(f)’s language concerning 
“components” that are “combined” as supporting a tangible meaning 
for the term “component.”144 Thus, software “in the abstract” is not a 
component under § 271(f), but software encoded on a medium can 
be.145 The Microsoft Court’s important distinction between software 
“in the abstract” — which cannot be a component — and software 
encoded “on a medium”146 — which can be a component — shows 
that a CAD file stored on a tangible medium can sometimes be a 
component.147 
Yet, some commentators have suggested that the decision holds that 
software stored in a medium is not a “component” under § 271(f).148 
This view misapprehends the reasoning in Microsoft. The Court was 
clear that only software in the abstract could not be a component, but 
software in a medium could be.149 Thus, a CAD file (i.e., software) on 
a medium (i.e., memory) could be a component. 
In a well-written article considering the Microsoft decision’s 
importance for CAD files under § 271(c), Daniel Brean avoids this 
 
 142 Id. at 446. 
 143 Id. at 442. 
 144 Id. at 449. 
 145 Id. at 449-51. 
 146 A “medium” includes CDs and any other form of storage, including a server or 
the memory on a computer. See id. at 448-49. 
 147 The Court ultimately found there was no infringement because the components 
had not been combined to form the patented invention, as is required under § 271(f). 
On this point the majority employed a very literal interpretation of the statute and 
decided that the component actually combined to make the infringing device was not 
the master file sent from the United States, but rather the copy of the master file. See id. 
at 453-54. Because the copy used for combination was not “supplied from the United 
States” as required by § 271(f), but instead was created in a foreign country, Microsoft 
was not liable for the copies. Id. 
 148 See, e.g., Robert A. McFarlane & Timothy V. Fisher, Software Patents Under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f): Should Congress Amend § 271 to Harmonize Protection Between Tangible 
and Intangible Inventions?, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 183, 184 (2010) (“Specifically, 
the Supreme Court held in Microsoft v. AT&T that a software ‘master disk’ is not a 
‘component’ for purposes of § 271(f).”). 
 149 See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449-52. 
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mistake, but unfortunately appears to commit a related non sequitur.150 
Mr. Brean correctly notes the Court’s distinction between software in 
the abstract and software encoded on a medium, but then suggests that 
since “abstract instructions” are not components, “CAD files should not 
be considered ‘components’ of subsequently printed objects.”151 To the 
extent that Mr. Brean suggests CAD files cannot be components at all, 
Microsoft clearly suggests the opposite — that CAD files can be 
“components” as long as they are encoded on a medium.152 Because the 
CAD files of interest in an infringement action would be encoded on a 
medium, they could qualify as “components” under § 271. 
On the other hand, for reasons other than those that commentators 
have noted, the thrust of the Microsoft decision hints that it might be 
difficult to capture CAD file distributors under § 271(c). Specifically, 
the Court drew a firm distinction between the parts of the invention 
actually covered by the claims and the things used to make those 
parts.153 Thus, while the copy of the software was required by the 
claims, the master disk was merely used to make the copy.154 By 
analogy, the Court might distinguish between the physical device 
required by a patent claim and the CAD file used to make it. 
Yet the Microsoft opinion does not contain any language addressing 
whether a software file that embodies the entire invention might 
constitute a component under § 271.155 Rather, Microsoft states that a 
software file that makes a component of an invention is not itself a 
component of the invention. This point is made clearer by considering 
the Court’s dicta in which it used a non-software example: 
A machine for making sprockets might be used by a 
manufacturer to produce tens of thousands of sprockets an 
hour. That does not make the machine a “component” of the 
tens of thousands of devices in which the sprockets are 
incorporated, at least not under any ordinary understanding of 
the term “component.” Congress, of course, might have 
 
 150 See Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 798. 
 151 Id. at 800. The basis for Mr. Brean’s conclusion is not entirely clear. To the 
extent that he means that CAD files in the abstract (not stored in computer memory) 
are not components, the Microsoft opinion supports him. 
 152 See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449-51. 
 153 Id. at 453 (“Under this formulation, the very components supplied from the 
United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined abroad 
to form the patented invention at issue.”). 
 154 Id. at 453-54. 
 155 See generally id. (discussing whether software can be considered a component 
when its combination with a computer creates an infringement). 
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included within § 271(f)’s compass, for example, not only 
combinable “components” of a patented invention, but also 
“information, instructions, or tools from which those 
components readily may be generated.”156 
This dictum is not on all fours with a patented device made from a 
CAD file. The Court is suggesting that a machine would not be a 
component if it makes components (i.e., sprockets) of a patented 
invention.157 But in the CAD file scenario, the “machine” in the 
analogy would be the 3D printer, and the thing made by the 3D 
printer is not a component of the patented item, but rather is the 
entire patented item. Thus, Microsoft does not directly tell us how to 
treat CAD files even under § 271(f), though its direction does not 
provide encouragement to those seeking to construe CAD files as 
components under § 271(c). 
The Microsoft decision focused on § 271(f), and the Court took a 
narrow approach to interpreting that provision in light of the 
presumption against the extraterritorial extension of U.S. patent 
law.158 As a result, courts may be willing to take a fresh, broader look 
at the issue of whether CAD files are components of printed items 
under § 271(c).159 If a court were willing to differentiate between 
§ 271(f) and (c) for CAD files, it would require a very narrow parsing 
of each section’s language. For a CAD file distributor to be liable 
under § 271(c), a court would have to interpret the CAD file to be a 
“component of the patented machine.”160 But the court would also 
have to say that CAD files are not “components” that “will be 
 
 156 Id. at 451. 
 157 See id. at 450-51 (analogizing software in the abstract to a physical blueprint 
and stating, “[a] blueprint may contain precise instructions for the construction and 
combination of the components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable 
component of that device”). 
 158 See id. at 442. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. 
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2123-28 (2008) [hereinafter 
Extraterritoriality] (discussing the principle against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law in the context of patent law). 
 159 An additional element of the case’s context suggests a narrow reading. Microsoft 
can be read as a decision to treat U.S. software companies on the same footing as 
traditional industry because in traditional industry a company that designs a product 
in the United States can export that design (i.e., information) to manufacture 
components abroad without facing § 271(f) liability. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 40-41, Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056), 
2006 WL 3693464. 
 160 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the 
United States . . . a component of a patented machine . . . .”). 
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combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe 
the patent.”161 To hold both interpretations at the same time would 
mean that a CAD file that prints an entire patented device is a 
“component” of the device, but that a CAD file that merely prints a 
component of a patented invention is not a “component” of the final 
combination.162 While such an interpretation is not a logical 
impossibility, it is not the most intuitive reading of the statute. 
Nevertheless, there might be good policy reasons to interpret § 271(c) 
in this manner, such as to allow the patentee to sue the party that 
represents the root cause of the infringement.163 
The foregoing discussion shows that patentees seeking to control 
CAD files will find weak allies in § 271(b) and § 271(c). Indirect 
infringement theories may allow patentees to capture the most brazen 
infringers, but not much more. Moreover, a patent holder relying on a 
strategy of suing end users who physically print the object will 
encounter several problems, including: (1) detection (people printing 
in their homes are hard to catch); (2) diffusion (even if the patentee 
ce, the Federal Circuit and even the Supreme Court increasingly 
suing one’s customers.164 Thus, traditional and obvious avenues for 
legal protection will usually leave patent holders floundering. The 
next Part explores an avenue through which patent holders can gain 
protection against DMT infringement threats. 
III. DIRECT DIGITAL INFRINGEMENT 
Claims of direct infringement against those who actually “print” the 
device and indirect infringement against CAD file distributors would 
provide only minimal protection for patentees. They would be much 
better protected if they had a claim for direct infringement based on 
the CAD file itself. The majority of commentators who have analyzed 
whether digital files can directly infringe patent claims directed to 
physical objects simply dismiss this potential based on the view that 
the law requires a physical embodiment of the invention.165 In this 
 
 161 See id. § 271(f)(2). 
 162 In essence, it would require saying that a component (the CAD file) of a 
component (the physical piece) is not a component of the final combination. 
 163 Cf. Thornewell, supra note 120, at 2833-43 (analyzing the potential judicial 
treatment of CAD files as “components” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)). Many of Mr. 
Thornewell’s arguments apply with equal force to § 271(c). 
 164 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Brean, Asserting Patents, 
supra note 18, at 789-90 (“It would be better from the patentee’s perspective to 
proceed on a theory of infringement that finds the seller of the CAD files liable, but 
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Part, we challenge this view and demonstrate why CAD files 
themselves could directly infringe patent claims in the absence of a 
physical embodiment. 
Direct infringement in its classic form166 arises when someone 
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the patented invention 
without authorization from the patent owner.167 Historically, 
infringement generally was tied to physical instantiations of 
inventions.168 Infringement of methods or processes typically involved 
some device that would perform the process.169 Over time, Congress 
has eroded this tangibility requirement in other versions of 
infringement under § 271.170 But such a shift is occurring under § 
271(a) as well. 
In a previous article, one of us offered a bifurcated approach to the 
acts of infringement under § 271(a).171 Infringement by making, using, 
or importing the invention necessarily contemplates a tangible version 
of the invention because what is being appropriated is the physical 
item itself.172 In contrast, for infringing sales and offers to sell the 
invention, it is the economic value of the invention being 
appropriated, not the physical item.173 As such, there should be no 
requirement for a physical instantiation of the invention with sales of, 
and offers to sell, the claimed invention.174 
The advent of 3D printing and other technologies that utilize CAD 
files provides the occasion to reconsider this bias towards tangibility 
for patent infringement not only for sales and offers to sell the claimed 
 
the distributors of the CAD files do not ‘make’ the product.”); Depoorter, supra note 
14, at 1487 (assuming direct patent infringement would only arise once CAD file is 
used to print the object). 
 166 There are newer forms of direct infringement that have been added to the 
Patent Act. See generally Holbrook, Consequences of Akamai, supra note 53, at 502 n.20 
(delineating the newer forms of direct infringement). For purposes of this article, we 
will focus on 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 167 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 168 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 755. 
 169 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1980) 
(discussing patent infringement claim concerning satellite control system); Acme Steel 
Co. v. E. Venetian Blind Co., 130 F. Supp. 459 (D. Md. 1955) (holding one-stage 
machine method did not infringe on plaintiff’s patent). 
 170 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 815-20 (discussing how 
infringement under ANDA litigation and § 271(f) no longer require tangible items for 
infringement). 
 171 Id. at 805-15. 
 172 Id. at 813-15. 
 173 Id. at 805-13. 
 174 Id. at 805. 
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invention but also for making, using, and importing it. When a 
physical instantiation of the device is a mere button press away, does it 
really make sense to view only the tangible embodiment of the 
invention as infringing? In the software context, the tangible-
intangible divide has already been erased, with software now able to 
perform functions that hardware would have done in the past.175 Do 
we think the patent system should also erase that divide? We are the 
first to explore this potential. 
There are no perfect tangible-era analogies to CAD files as 
manufacturing tools, but two commonly suggested comparisons are to 
blueprints and molds.176 Under patent law doctrine in the tangible era, 
“making” or “using” a mold or blueprints for a patented device would 
not constitute direct infringement.177 In the age of digital 
manufacturing, however, lawmakers will need to study closely 
whether CAD files should be treated as identical to the tangible item. 
While the idea may sound foreign to our tangible-tuned ears, it may 
sound perfectly natural to digital manufacturing natives one day.178 
For example, in the digital era of movies and books, lay people do not 
distinguish between having a digital copy of a song or book: if you 
have the file, you have the book. 179 Once 3D printing is ubiquitous 
and inexpensive, perhaps laypeople will feel the same way about CAD 
files — having the file is the same as having the object. This section 
 
 175 See supra note 2. 
 176 See Thornewell, supra note 120, at 2833-42. 
 177 See United States v. C.M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 118 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d. Cir. 
1941) (discussing blueprints for lifeboats, and noting the produced boats “finally 
proved to infringe claims of the patent”); Niks v. Marinette Paper Co., 11 F.R.D. 384, 
385 (N.D.N.Y. 1951) (requiring defendant to produce blueprints of device alleged to 
infringe on plaintiff’s patent, but not ordering physical inspection of actual device); 
Luten v. Camp, 221 F. 424, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (discussing a dispute over discovery 
of blueprints, not to prove infringement via blueprints alone, but instead as relevant to 
show infringement pertaining to a reinforced concrete bridge that had been 
constructed). 
 178 Recall that it may be possible for patentees to draft claims covering digital 
versions of their inventions. See supra note 19. If such claims constitute patentable 
subject matter, they would be the easiest route to protect CAD files in the digital age. 
Such claims would not, however, protect patentees whose patents have already issued. 
180 See Katie Arnold-Ratliff, Soft Target: Have Reports of the Paperback’s Death Been 
Greatly Exaggerated?, SLATE (June 20, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
technology/technology/2013/06/declining_sales_of_paperbacks_are_e_readers_killing
_the_softcover.html (discussing potential disruption of resale and paperback books in 
light of ebooks, showing that the two are fungible (though with different collateral 
market effects)). 
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explores the potential for direct infringement based on the CAD files 
themselves. 
A. Selling or Offering to Sell the Claimed Invention via a CAD File 
The simplicity of converting a CAD file to the actual object should 
lead us to ask whether someone selling or offering to sell the CAD file 
has effectively sold the item itself. Given that the line between the 
intangible CAD file and the tangible item now is so thin, one could 
easily argue that the sale of the file should be effectively an infringing 
sale of the item itself. The interest in the purchaser is not the CAD file 
itself, but instead in the item to be produced by the CAD file. We 
think such sales and offers to sell are attempts to appropriate the 
economic value of the item, harming the patent owner pecuniarily. 
Historically, however, the law has required tangible embodiments of 
the invention, even for infringing sales.180 This is unsurprising for two 
reasons. First, during the industrial age, most technology was 
incorporated into some sort of physical form.181 Second, the courts 
were somewhat hostile to patents because of the seemingly 
anticompetitive nature of their exclusive rights.182 The Supreme Court 
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. interpreted § 271(a) 
narrowly in part by considering “this Nation’s historical antipathy to 
monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster 
competition.”183 
 
 180 See, e.g., Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng’g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. 
Conn. 1979) (“When the thing in question is an apparatus and the issue is patent 
infringement by sale, partial delivery will not suffice; in order for there to have been a 
sale within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the entire apparatus must have been 
constructed and ready for use.”). See generally Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 
9, at 801-03 (discussing state of the law requiring a physical embodiment of the 
invention for infringement). 
 181 See Miriam Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 153, 157-58 (2014). 
 182 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 223 (1980) 
(White, J., dissenting) (“For decades this Court has denied relief from contributory 
infringement to patent holders who attempt to extend their patent monopolies to 
unpatented materials used in connection with patented inventions.”); Ductmate 
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., No. 84 C 5152, 1985 WL 2179, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
12, 1985) (“Requiring a direct infringement in the United States balances the 
patentee’s right to the exclusive control over his patent against the historical antipathy 
to monopoly in order to assure that the patentee not over-extend the reach of his 
limited patent monopoly.”). 
 183 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972). 
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Although the Supreme Court might continue to harbor such 
concerns about the anticompetitive aspects of patents,184 Congress 
clearly does not share that viewpoint any longer.185 Congress has 
expanded the scope of infringement numerous times over the last forty 
years.186 In general, Congress views patents favorably.187 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has been more 
willing to reconsider whether something tangible must exist for there 
to be infringement by selling or offering to sell the invention.188 As one 
of us previously articulated, infringing sales and offers to sell an 
invention are “an appropriation of the economic value of the 
invention, as opposed to its physical incarnation” such that a physical 
embodiment should not be required.189 
 
 184 See Tim Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court About to Rule that Software is Ineligible 
for Patent Protection?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2014/03/16/is-the-supreme-court-about-to-rule-that-software-is-ineligible-for-
patent-protection; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s 
Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63-65 (2013). 
 185 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 764 (“The history of § 271 
demonstrates that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s historical antipathy to patents, 
Congress has taken an expansive view of them, enlarging the class of activities covered 
by the patent statute’s forms of infringement.”). 
 186 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering 
in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 UC DAVIS L. REV. 701, 719-23 (2004) 
[hereinafter Territoriality Waning] (discussing amendments to § 271); see also 
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the 
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2004) 
(discussing constitutionality of expansion of forms of infringement for existing 
patents). 
 187 One exception to Congress’s favorable views of the patent system has been 
recent patent reform efforts to address patent assertion entities (“PAEs”), also known 
as trolls. See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) 
(coining the term “patent assertion entities”). Some commentators have criticized 
aspects of these reform efforts. See, e.g., Timothy Holbrook, Not All Patent Trolls Are 
Demons, CNN (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:08 AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/ 
holbrook-patent-trolls-demons (explaining the benefits that patent assertion entities 
provide to holders of valid patents). 
 188 See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[The district court] never reached 
the factual issue of whether the subject of the offer to sell was of a ‘patented invention’ 
by analyzing the design of the rig. Of course, in this analysis, the district court must 
determine what was offered for sale, not what was ultimately delivered.”). 
 189 Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 1087, 1106 (2012) [hereinafter After Transocean]. 
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The Federal Circuit expressly adopted this approach in Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.190 In 
that case, Maersk had offered to sell an oil rig and that offer had been 
accepted.191 The rig ultimately delivered, however, differed from the 
one contemplated in the offer and sale and, in fact, did not infringe.192 
The Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that there could be 
infringement based on the diagrams and descriptions contained in the 
offer to sell.193 The court emphasized that the “underlying purpose of 
holding someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to 
prevent ‘generating interest in a potential infringing product to the 
commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.’”194 Because an offer to 
sell or sale of an item that has yet to be constructed can harm the 
patentee, the court allowed a claim for infringement based solely on a 
paper contract and rejected the defendant’s argument that “the entire 
apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use in order to 
have been sold.”195 
The Transocean decision is the first to find infringement under 
§ 271(a) based on documents alone without a physical embodiment of 
the invention.196 We have written in support of the court’s focus on 
the economic interests of the patentee,197 as have other 
commentators.198 By focusing on the harm done to the patentee by the 
sale or offer to sale, the court opened the door to finding infringement 
based on the sale or offer to sell of a CAD file. An offer to sell or sale of 
 
 190 617 F.3d 1296. 
 191 Id. at 1307. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 1310 n.4. 
 194 Id. at 1309 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 195 Id. at 1311. 
 196 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1106. Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”) litigation also is based primarily on paper — the ANDA 
— as opposed to what is actually sold on the market. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, 
supra note 9, at 815-17. 
 197 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1106; see also Holbrook, 
Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 788-98; Osborn, Offer to Sell, supra note 123, at 172-
76, 199-200. 
 198 See Melissa Y. Lerner, You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct 
Infringement and the Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207, 232 (2011); Scott A. Cromar, Note, The Location of the 
Contemplated Sale as the Ultimate Guide in “Offer to Sell” Transnational U.S. Patent 
Infringement Cases, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1755, 1783; Rex W. Miller, Note, Construing 
“Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests Rather Than Territoriality 
Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 441-50 (2009). 
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a CAD file of the patented invention would directly impact the 
patentee’s commercial interests. The sale of the CAD file could 
displace the sale of the actual item. The patent owner may also have to 
lower its price — price erosion — in order to compete with the CAD 
files, even if no one ever purchases them.199 
Such a step is not terribly surprising. The Supreme Court has 
recognized in the patent validity context that an invention can be 
commercially appropriated absent a tangible embodiment.200 Under 
the 1952 Patent Act’s on-sale bar, a patent applicant is barred from 
obtaining a patent if she offered to sell the invention more than one 
year prior to filing the application.201 The Supreme Court in Pfaff v. 
Wells Electronics made it clear that, to be on-sale, the invention need 
not be physically built: diagrams and other descriptions that would 
enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to build the 
device are sufficient.202 Thus, in the on-sale bar context, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that “the value of an invention can be 
appropriated even absent a physical incarnation of the invention.”203 
Transocean is, in essence, a modest extension of this reality. 
One commentator, however, has rejected application of Transocean 
to CAD files.204 Mr. Brean argues, as a doctrinal matter, that 
Transocean is inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision in 
Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co.205 Mr. Brean highlights the 
 
 199 See supra note 125 (discussing price erosion). 
 200 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998). 
 201 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). The America Invents Act (“AIA”) also precludes a 
patent if the invention was on sale, but provides a one-year grace period only if the 
on-sale activity was by the inventor or by someone who took the invention from the 
inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). For a discussion of how the AIA prior art 
provisions operate, see MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 71, at 691-98. While 
it is highly likely that the interpretations of the 1952 on-sale bar will define the AIA 
provisions, there is some dispute as to whether “secret” sales will trigger the bar under 
the AIA as they do under the 1952 Patent Act. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Does 
‘Public Use’ Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394153 (discussing 
uncertainty surrounding interpretation of amended statute). 
 202 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things 
Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and 
the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933 (2000) 
(suggesting how courts should approach on-sale bar questions after the Pfaff 
decision). 
 203 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1108. 
 204 Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 792. 
 205 Id. at 791-93. Brean also relies on the district court decision in Ecodyne Corp. v. 
Croll-Reynolds Engineering Co., 491 F. Supp. 194 (D. Conn. 1979), to support the 
argument that there must be a physical embodiment in order for there to be a sale of 
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Transocean court’s language that reads: “[A] ‘sale’ is not limited to the 
transfer of tangible property; a sale may also be the agreement by 
which such a transfer takes place. In this case, there was a contract to 
sell a rig that included schematics.”206 Mr. Brean interprets this 
language to mean that “Transocean still requires an agreement to 
transfer a tangible object” and thus would not cover the sale of CAD 
files.207 
Before addressing Mr. Brean’s doctrinal position, we emphasize that 
ours is not merely a doctrinal inquiry. We are not simply asking 
whether the law at present will allow such liability. We are asking 
whether the law should do so. Our contention is that it should, as a 
normative matter, regardless of whether current case law permits it. 
But, even doctrinally, we do not share the view that Transocean was 
wrongly decided and that it should not apply in this context. 
 
the invention. Id. at 790-91. Ecodyne does expressly hold as such, but the decision is 
obviously not binding on the Federal Circuit. Indeed, it pre-dates both the creation of 
the Federal Circuit and the amendment of § 271(a) to include offering to sell the 
invention as a form of infringement. See Technical Mfg. Corp. v. Integrated Dynamics 
Eng’g, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 339, 342-43 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Compounding the 
conceptual difficulty is the fact that both Joy Technologies and Ecodyne arose during an 
earlier period when United States patent law did not include liability for offers to sell 
infringing products.”). 
Moreover, the court’s argument in Ecodyne would render the “sell” form of 
infringement superfluous: if the invention must be made in order for there to be a 
sale, then there would be no need for infringement via a sale. The issue would resolve 
into the issue of the appropriate damages award. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra 
note 9, at 759-60 (“The Court, by phrasing the question of whether the infringer 
‘did . . . make (and then sell)’ suggests that the making of the invention is a necessary 
prerequisite to selling the invention. This reading of the statute seemingly vitiates the 
‘sale’ form of infringement because, for there to be a sale, the person selling the device 
would have infringed already under the ‘make’ provision. This reading violates the 
canon of statutory construction that ‘courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes 
that render language superfluous.’” (citations omitted)); see also Holbrook, After 
Transocean, supra note 189, at 1107-08 (“The Court [in Deepsouth] thus seems to 
suggest that infringing sales are tied to the manufacture of the good, not merely to the 
sale. Transocean is arguably inconsistent with this view. In Deepsouth, all of the 
components were manufactured, just not assembled. . . . The stronger argument is 
that the Supreme Court did not truly confront purely intangible infringement through 
sales. Instead, it was focused on the actual manufacture of the components that were 
then sent overseas. The Court did not address what would have happened if the device 
ultimately assembled had been sold in the United States pursuant to a contract before 
any of the parts were assembled. The tangibility issue simply was not before the 
Court.”). 
 206 Brean, Asserting Patents, supra note 18, at 792 (quoting Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1311 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207 Id. at 793. 
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Mr. Brean reads far more into Lang that it deserves.208 In Lang, the 
patent owner filed an infringement suit based on the production of a 
patented boat hull, but the hull was not yet fully constructed.209 The 
accused infringer was not the manufacturer of the hull but instead the 
intended purchaser.210 The Federal Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the complaint 
contained two counts that related to patent infringement.211 The first 
count was for a declaratory judgment for the threat of future 
infringement, and the Federal Circuit held there was no actual 
controversy because “the accused infringers had not distributed sales 
literature, prepared to solicit orders, or engaged in any activity 
indicating that the ship would soon be ready for sea.”212 As for the 
second count, a request for a preliminary injunction, the entirety of 
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is as follows: 
That statute, by itself, cannot be interpreted to cover acts other 
than an actual making, using or selling of the patented 
invention. Because Pacific Marine’s allegedly infringing ship’s 
hull was still nine months from completion when the 
complaint was filed, the district court correctly dismissed 
Count II for failure to state a claim under section 271.213 
There is virtually no discussion of whether a sale could constitute 
infringement absent a tangible item. Given the thin, conclusory 
reasoning and that the accused infringer was not the seller, Brean 
reads too much into the opinion by suggesting that Lang requires a 
tangible item for there to be an infringing sale. 
Moreover, and most importantly, Lang predates the adoption of the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(“TRIPS”), as a result of which Congress amended § 271(a) to add 
 
 208 See id. at 791. 
 209 Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“At the 
time suit was filed, Thompson Metal was in the process of manufacturing a hull 
structure for Pacific Marine & Supply that Lang contends would, when finished, 
infringe its patent.”). 
 210 Id.; see also Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 703 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (D. 
Haw. 1989) (“Pursuant to a contract with Pacific Marine, Thompson Metal is in the 
process of manufacturing the hull structure for a swath type vessel which Plaintiffs 
contend will infringe on one or more of their patents.”). 
 211 The complaint contained five counts total. Lang, 895 F.3d at 763. Lang 
appealed the two counts relating to patent infringement, one alleging false patent 
marking, and the other alleging false advertising. Id. 
 212 Id. at 763-65. 
 213 Id. at 765 (citations omitted). 
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“offering to sell” and “importing” as forms of direct infringement.214 
As such, the decision has no precedential effect on the interpretation 
of the “offer to sell” provision, as was performed in Transocean.215 
Moreover, the adoption of “offers to sell” as a form of direct 
infringement may require a reconsideration of the “sale” form if 
inconsistencies arise between the two.216 
Transocean of course does not definitively answer the question of 
CAD files because the court was not considering digital infringement. 
Yet the thrust of the opinion may be broader than Mr. Brean suggests 
for at least three reasons. First, although the offer to sell did 
contemplate the eventual transfer of a tangible device, the defendant 
would have been liable even if no transfer ever took place.217 Thus 
tangibility was not a requirement for infringement under the court’s 
analysis. 
Second, rather than focusing on the tangibility of the device, the 
court focused on the economic interests of the patentee.218 The 
patentee’s interests would often be more directly implicated by the sale 
of CAD files than a contract for the future sale of a tangible item. CAD 
files are easily transferable and are one click away from producing a 
tangible object. A transfer of a CAD file is likely to take place 
immediately and makes future, tangible infringement all too easy. 
Contracts for future delivery as in Transocean may never lead to 
tangible infringement because the contracted item may never be built, 
let alone delivered. 
Third, as this Article has discussed, 3D printing and other DMT are 
bridging the digital and physical worlds, rendering many of the 
distinctions between “tangible” and “intangible” anachronistic. 
Whether the device was “tangible” at the time it was transferred is 
inconsequential from the view of the patentee’s interests. Because the 
 
 214 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(3)(B), 108 
Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994); see also Holbrook, Territoriality Waning, supra note 186, at 722. 
 215 See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 216 See Technical Mfg. Corp. v. Integrated Dynamics Eng’g, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 
339, 342-44 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 217 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310-11. Infringement would hold even if the device 
was never constructed or was constructed in a modified way to avoid infringement. 
Indeed, the defendant in Transocean attempted to avoid infringement by constructing 
the device in a way that differed from the specifications contained in the offer to sell. 
The court refused to allow subsequent design modification to avoid infringement, 
stating, “[t]he potentially infringing article is the rig sold in the contract, not the 
altered rig that Maersk USA delivered to the U.S.” Id. at 1311. 
 218 Id. at 1309. 
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CAD file can be printed with ease in the privacy of a home or business, 
the patentee does not care whether it was printed before the transfer 
or after. In fact, the transfer of the CAD file is potentially more harmful 
to the patentee, because that CAD file can be copied and further 
distributed to many more users. 
Opponents of our view could argue that CAD files are different from 
the Transocean scenario. In Transocean, the offer and completed sale 
contemplated the delivery of a single item, the oil rig.219 The lost sale 
is tied to the singular item contemplated by the commercial activity. In 
contrast, a sale or offer to sell a CAD file is not limited to one 
instantiation of the invention. The CAD file can be used to create 
multiple copies of the patented invention. There is no correlation 
between the sale and the item. The CAD file, in some sense, just the 
potential for infringement, and there is no infringement until an item 
has been produced. Thus, infringement should be limited in the 
context of CAD files solely to the “making” of the invention, once the 
CAD file is used to direct the printer. 
We do not view this as a distinction of importance. Part of that 
argument begs the question of what the “item” should be — the file or 
the ultimately produced item. Moreover, it would seem that the sale of 
the file actually risks far greater harm to the patent owner than the sale 
of a single embodiment (tangible or intangible) of the patented 
invention. Ultimately, we view this concern as one more of remedy — 
injunctions and the appropriate damages award — as opposed to one 
of liability. In other words, a CAD file versus a contract may impact 
how we measure the harm to the patentee and, as a result, the 
appropriate damages. It should not determine the threshold question 
of whether there is liability. 
Hence, the Federal Circuit and even the Supreme Court increasingly 
recognize that tangibility is not the sine qua non of offers to sell and 
sales of patented inventions.220 It is possible that the Federal Circuit 
could already regard the offer to sell and sale of CAD files as an act of 
patent infringement.221 Nevertheless, patentees may remain vulnerable 
 
 219 Id. at 1307. 
 220 See Holbrook, After Transocean, supra note 189, at 1108 (discussing Pfaff v. 
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998)). 
 221 Treating offers and sales of CAD files as acts of infringement would produce 
many interesting consequences. Although space constraints prevent us from exploring 
them in this Article, we query for future research whether mere advertisements of 
CAD files might constitute contract-law “offers” because there is no “multiple 
acceptance” problem that renders most advertisements mere invitations for offers. See 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 134 (4th ed. 2004) (“A customer would not usually 
have reason to believe that the shopkeeper intended exposure to the risk of a 
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to harm from CAD files because, as discussed previously, CAD files 
can be made so cheaply that others might be willing not to sell them, 
but to offer them to the world for free.222 
B. Should a CAD File Constitute “Making” the Patented Invention 
A large gap in protection to the patentee, however, is that liability 
for selling or offering to sell the invention requires a sale; offers to 
donate and actual donations are not infringing.223 If freely transferred 
CAD files are not sales or offers to sell, a patentee could only capture 
the creators and purveyors of such files through a change or extension 
of current law. Some of the CAD webpages that have popped up 
simply post these files and allow free downloads, and peer-to-peer 
networks already facilitate free transfers of CAD files.224 These 
activities fall outside of the commercial appropriation protection 
afforded by the “sales” and “offers to sell” forms of infringement. 
Patentees may want to rely on the statutory category of infringement 
by “making” the patented invention.225 Each act of copying a CAD file 
would constitute an independent act of “making” the invention. Given 
the simplicity of translating a file into a physical embodiment, we 
consider whether the tangible-intangible divide still makes sense. In 
earlier work, one of us argued that “making” the patented invention 
required a physical embodiment because the infringement involved 
 
multitude of acceptances resulting in a number of contracts exceeding the 
shopkeeper’s inventory.”). Additionally, numerous extraterritoriality issues will arise 
when offers cross national borders. See Lucas S. Osborn, Ripple Effects in the Law: The 
Broadening Meaning of an “Offer to Sell” in Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 549, 
559-72 (2014) [hereinafter Ripple Effects] (describing extraterritorial consequences of 
inter-country offers). 
 222 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 223 See HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding, in the personal jurisdiction context, that “a mere offer to donate, where a 
donation is never made, cannot be an offer for sale” under § 271(a)). The court 
limited its holding to the facts of the case, which were that the offered donation was 
small and insignificant, the donation was never consummated, and the would-be 
donor appeared not to be motivated by any current or future commercial gain. Id. 
 224 Ernesto, supra note 66. For a webpage facilitating finding free CAD file 
downloads, see Where to Find Free 3D CAD Models for 3D Printing, 3D PRINTING SYS., 
http://3dprintingsystems.com/where-to-find-free-3d-cad-models-for-3d-printing (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
 225 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (listing the unauthorized “making” of the 
patented invention as acts of infringement). A patentee could also attempt to sue a 
CAD file owner for “using” the invention, but current law interprets “using” the 
invention in such a way as to make this claim unlikely to succeed. See Brean, Asserting 
Patents, supra note 18, at 800-03. 
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the physical appropriation of the invention.226 Commercial 
appropriations through sales and offers to sell the invention, however, 
would not require a physical embodiment.227 CAD files and 3D 
printing, however, require us to reconsider this bifurcation. 
In thinking about the ways that an invention can be “made,” one 
can consider a spectrum of activities that begin to approximate the 
making of the invention, represented in the below diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the far right is the classic case of making the invention — a 
completed tangible item. There is no controversy that completion of 
the patented invention would qualify as “making” the invention under 
§ 271(a). At the other extreme, there are blueprints, engineering 
design diagrams, and the like. These items, whether paper or digital, 
disclose the claimed invention, yet there remains a need for 
considerable effort and skill to create the physical manifestation of the 
invention. Historically, such diagrams would not constitute an 
infringing “making” of the invention,228 and we agree. The amount of 
effort, skill, and resources required to translate the blueprint into the 
actual invention convinces us that mere blueprints should not 
constitute infringement for making the claimed invention. 
Molds are somewhat closer to finished items, at least for inventions 
amenable to being formed in this fashion. Once the mold is created, an 
industrial process can create the item; yet this entails expensive and 
detailed machinery and processes.229 So, while this moves us down the 
 
 226 Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 805 (“The nature of the 
appropriation varies according to the infringing act. In the context of offers to sell the 
invention and actual sales of the invention, the appropriation is commercial. In this 
context, the infringer has utilized the invention for commercial gain without 
compensating the patentee. In the context of ‘making,’ ‘using,’ or ‘importing’ the 
invention, however, the appropriation is physical use of the invention without 
compensation. To properly analyze infringement as appropriation, the courts should 
take a bifurcated approach, analyzing offers to sell and sales distinctly from the 
infringement analysis for making, using, or importing the invention.”). 
 227 Id. 
 228 See supra note 177. 
 229 See Alec, Is 3D Printing a Viable and Affordable Alternative to Injection Molding 
Production?, 3DERS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.3ders.org/articles/20141106-is-3d-
printing-technology-a-viable-and-affordable-alternative-to-injection-molding-
Blueprint Unassembled
Parts 
Molds Completed 
Item 
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spectrum to some extent, we do not believe that molds cross the line 
where the mold alone should constitute an act of making the claimed 
invention. We also expect that this question rarely arises because, 
unlike CAD files, few, if any, molds can create a complete and 
operable patented product with no further assembly required.230 
Another point on the spectrum is the situation where someone has 
made all of the components of the invention but has not assembled 
them. These scenarios were present in Deepsouth231 and Paper 
Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.232 In Deepsouth, the 
accused infringer had manufactured the components of the invention 
and shipped them abroad for assembly.233 Addressing the territorial 
limits of U.S. patent law, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, 
concluded that the accused infringer had not “made” the invention 
within the United States under § 271(a) of the Patent Act.234 
The Federal Circuit did not confront a territoriality issue in Paper 
Converting. Instead the court had to deal with a patent’s expiration: the 
accused infringer never assembled the complete machine during the 
patent term.235 The infringer instead tested various parts of the device 
in isolation, and the customer assembled the machine two days after 
the patent expired.236 The Federal Circuit concluded that this activity 
constituted infringement and distinguished Deepsouth as being limited 
to the extraterritorial issue.237 
The Federal Circuit’s distinction of Deepsouth is dubious, and courts 
have since marginalized Paper Converting.238 Regardless, the Supreme 
 
production.html. 
 230 See, e.g., Casting: Metal Casting Process, THE LIBRARY OF MFG., 
http://www.thelibraryofmanufacturing.com/metalcasting_basics.html (last visited Dec. 
31, 2014) (“A mold is formed into the geometric shape of a desired part.”). 
 231 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 232 Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 233 See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 158, at 2131-32. 
 234 See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531. Congress legislatively overruled Deepsouth when 
it adopted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in 1984. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., 
Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 158, at 2132. 
 235 Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 15-16. 
 236 Id. at 14-15; see also J. Dwyer Murphy, Case Note, Paper Converting Machine 
Company v. Magna-Graphics Corporation: Increased Protection Against Making and 
Using Combination Patents, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 776 (1985). 
 237 Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 16-20. 
 238 See De Graffenried v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 209, 214 (1992); Conner 
Peripherals, Inc. v. W. Digital Corp., No. C-93-20117-RMW-EAI, 1993 WL 645932, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1993) (noting that the narrow purpose of Paper Converting 
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Court’s split decision in Deepsouth decision and the arguably 
inconsistent holding of the Federal Circuit in Paper Converting 
confirm that the creation of the components of a device that remain 
unassembled falls far closer to the line of an infringing “making” of 
the invention (and, in the minds of some, actually crosses that line). 
Where, then, do CAD files fall? They are completely intangible, 
which makes them considerably different than unassembled 
components. Yet they are far different than blueprints or molds 
because the creation of the object from the file is simple and routine. It 
just takes the push of a button. Potentially, it is even easier than 
assembling the components of an apparatus, which could take 
considerable effort and skill, not to mention tools. 
Our contention is that the interest in CAD files is not the files 
themselves, but instead the object ultimately produced. Generally, 
someone does not download a CAD file simply for the purpose of 
having the file. Instead, the purpose is to produce the object for which 
the file codes. As a result, some of these freely disseminated CAD files 
would likely displace some of the patent holder’s sales. The 
dramatically reduced gap between the physical and intangible suggests 
that the mere creation of the CAD file could, and perhaps should, 
constitute an infringing “making” of the patented item. Otherwise, 
patentees will often be helpless against massive, gratuitous 
dissemination of CAD files.239 If the courts or Congress were to take 
this step, it would provide greater protection for patent holders against 
infringement in the emerging era of 3D printing and similar 
technologies. 
C. Intangible Infringement via the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The above direct infringement analysis highlights that 3D printing 
and other DMT have matured after the current patent infringement 
laws were drafted. Luckily, patent law, being concerned with the 
forefront of technological advancement, has important doctrines to 
accommodate technological change. One such doctrine, the doctrine 
 
was to preserve the patent term). 
 239 Although space constraints prevent us from addressing them here, we note that if 
the law considered copying a CAD file to be “making” the invention, many legal 
questions would arise. Just to raise a few: Query whether internet intermediaries should 
be liable for making copies on their servers? If a CAD file enters the United States 
electronically, does that constitute an “importation” (and if so, who is liable for the 
importation)? What of files passing temporarily through the United States on the “wires” 
of the internet (when 35 U.S.C. § 272 is limited to inventions needed on temporarily 
present vessels, aircraft, or vehicles)? We leave these questions to future work. 
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of equivalents, ensures that the “scope of a patent is not limited to its 
literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims 
described.”240 
The doctrine was created to prevent competitors from avoiding 
infringement by making unimportant and insubstantial differences to 
their technology.241 For example, one cannot escape infringement of a 
patent covering a complex patented machine by simply substituting 
screws for bolts when attaching the machine pieces together 
(assuming the claim required bolts). The doctrine is particularly useful 
to prevent the patent’s obsolescence. Patent owners are able to capture 
technologies that arise after the patent’s issuance that nevertheless are 
deemed close enough to the claimed invention to constitute 
infringement.242 
While the application of the doctrine of equivalents is highly fact-
intensive and not a “prisoner of a formula,”243 courts have developed 
various formulations for analyzing whether a particular accused device 
is equivalent to the patented device.244 First, courts can use the 
“insubstantial differences” test, which simply asks whether there is a 
substantial difference between an element of the patented product and 
the accused product.245 Second, courts can follow the “triple identity” 
test and ask whether the accused element performs substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially 
the same result.246 Finally, the known interchangeability of the 
claimed limitation and the element in the device accused of infringing 
also informs the analysis.247 Evaluation of equivalency remains a 
highly fact-intensive inquiry.248 
 
 240 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). 
 241 Id. 
 242 See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 174-75 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-29 (2009) 
[hereinafter Patent Law’s Possession Paradox]. 
 243 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
 244 We are using language loosely here; as explained below, the equivalents analysis 
looks not at the invention as a whole, but rather at each element or limitation in 
isolation. 
 245 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 
(1997); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Sage Prods., Inc. 
v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 246 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40. 
 247 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (“An important factor is whether persons 
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an 
ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.”). 
 248 Id. 
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As one of us has noted previously, it may be possible for patentees 
to use the doctrine of equivalents to capture CAD files, even if the 
courts do not adopt our above analysis for direct infringement for 
selling, offering to sell, or making the invention.249 A court 
confronting equivalency in the CAD context will have to perform the 
test on an element-by-element basis.250 Initially, this might appear 
conceptually difficult because CAD files do not have elements in the 
same way that physical devices do. The file itself has no “components” 
for a basis of comparison; they are merely code for the printer to 
produce the item. This line of thinking, however, demonstrates a pre-
digital era framework. In the digital era, courts could compare the 
elements of what the CAD file would print to the limitations listed in the 
patent claims. 
To a pre-digital mind, CAD files are very different from the physical 
device, and thus we suspect that there will be strong resistance to 
applying the doctrine of equivalents in this way. Again, however, in a 
post-digital manufacturing world, if a patentee cannot protect against 
the distribution of CAD files, it is largely powerless to stop many 
forms of infringement. Thus, if literal infringement cannot help the 
patentee, a fairness rationale could suggest applying the doctrine to 
CAD files.251 Applying the doctrine of equivalents in this novel way 
also finds support in the doctrine’s emphasis on technology that 
becomes significant after a patent was filed.252 In a world with 
 
 249 Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587 (“[A]s 3D printing brings 
closer together merges the worlds of bits and atoms, the equivalents argument does 
not seem that far-fetched — the CAD file is practically the same thing as the physical 
product.”). 
 250 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (“Each element contained in a patent claim is 
deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine 
of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the 
invention as a whole.”). Patent claims contain “elements” or “limitations,” which are 
simply the sub-parts of the invention. Thus, a patent claim to a chair might contain 
the elements of four legs, a flat surface for seating support, and a vertical surface for 
supporting the back of the user. The claim must also describe how the various 
elements are put together. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 96 (4th ed. 2013). 
 251 See generally Holbrook, Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, supra note 242, at 36-
37 (arguing fairness as most persuasive normative basis for doctrine of equivalents); 
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A 
New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1956-60 (2005) 
(tracing a fairness rationale for the doctrine of equivalents). 
 252 See Meurer & Nard, supra note 251, at 1970 (“The third source of friction arises 
from the difficulty foreseeing technical developments relevant to the patented 
technology.”); see also Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 
145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The doctrine of equivalents is necessary 
because one cannot predict the future. . . . [A] variant of an invention may be 
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ubiquitous DMT, CAD files will in many ways be insubstantially 
different from the physical device, just as a digital copy of a book is 
insubstantially different from the printed version. 
IV. SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE CLAIMS FOR DIGITAL PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT? 
Thus far, we have largely described potential applications of patent 
laws to DMT in light of the harm that patentees might incur from 
CAD files. We have demonstrated that patent law is already flexible 
enough to capture some digital patent infringement and that 
additional extensions of the law would capture much more. But it is 
important to look holistically at the issue in light of the patent 
system’s various goals and the effects of recognizing a claim for digital 
patent infringement. This Part explores a number of these 
countervailing considerations. 
A. Impact on the Incentive to Innovate 
Because the main purpose of the patent system is to incentivize 
innovation,253 we must carefully consider the impact on the costs and 
risks of innovation if the extensions we propose are adopted. As we 
have argued, if patentees cannot control the CAD files that are central 
to DMT, they will lose much of their ability to monetize their patent 
rights. This loss of enforcement power could dampen innovative 
incentives, possibly leading to underinvestment in innovation. 
But there is a flipside to the incentive story for DMT because DMT 
has the potential to significantly lower the costs of innovation, thus 
reducing the need for a strong patent system. One of us has explored 
 
developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial 
a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an 
infringement.”); Cotropia, supra note 242, at 161 (“As of late, the emphasis on the 
doctrine of equivalents has focused on protecting one specific type of equivalent 
termed an ‘after-arising equivalent.’”). Of course, 3D printing has existed since the 
1980s, but it has only recently begun to enter the public’s general awareness. See 
Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 560. Hence, neither inventors nor 
patent attorneys would be likely to have considered CAD files as a meaningful method 
of protection until recently. It cannot, however, be considered an “after-arising” 
technology indefinitely. At some point, it becomes the patentee’s obligation to 
affirmatively draft claims to CAD files, if patent law will allow it. 
 253 E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent laws 
promote [technological] progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited 
period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts.”). 
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the issue elsewhere254 and it is worth highlighting some of the impacts 
of DMT on innovation costs.255 For example, 3D printing is 
dramatically lowering the costs of scientific research tools used for 
basic research.256 3D printing also lowers the costs of prototyping an 
invention and advancing the prototype into a commercial 
embodiment.257 Once a commercial embodiment is ready for 
production, 3D printing lowers the costs and risks of a product launch 
because the inventor can manufacture on an as-needed basis, rather 
than paying huge up-front costs for mass-production machines. Of 
course, because CAD files can be transmitted directly to purchasers for 
remote printing, the costs of distributing final products can be greatly 
reduced as well. 
These are examples to highlight that, once mature, DMT will 
demand a thorough reevaluation of the patent system’s balance. If 
DMT dramatically reduces the costs and risks of innovation as a 
whole, then it might also correspondingly reduce the need for current 
patent incentives.258 A crucial premise of the patent system is that 
inventors need the period of exclusivity to recover sunk research and 
development costs.259 If DMT dramatically reduces these costs, then 
lawmakers may need to recalibrate the system. This is not necessarily 
to say that we should abolish the patent system, but rather that we 
might modify it to provide a smaller incentive. For example, we might 
shorten the patent term from its current term of twenty years from the 
application date.260 
 
 254 Lucas S. Osborn et al., The Case for Weaker Patents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2585764.  
 255 As used here, innovation includes the stages of basic research, invention, 
prototyping, developing a commercial embodiment, marketing, and distribution. Id. at 
14-15. 
 256 Joshua M. Pearce, Building Research Equipment with Free, Open-Source 
Hardware, 337 SCIENCE 1303, 1303-04 (2012); Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 15-22. 
 257 See, e.g., CHEE KAI CHUA ET AL., RAPID PROTOTYPING: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 
13-14 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the benefits of 3D printing); Osborn et al., supra note 
254, at 22-35. 
 258 However, one must also take into account that DMT makes it easier for 
infringers to copy successful products quickly. Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 44-46. 
 259 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SW. L.J. 123, 134-35 
(2006) [hereinafter Possession]. 
 260 Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 52-55. Our international obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) would limit 
Congress’s ability to alter patent terms because it requires at least a twenty-year term. 
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 
(1994) (adopting twenty-year term pursuant to TRIPS); Agreement on Trade-Related 
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Other scholars have likewise noticed the disruption that DMT will 
bring to patent law. Mark Lemley has noted that 3D printing and 
related technologies make it “entirely plausible to envision a not-too-
distant world in which most things that people want can be 
downloaded and created on site for very little money — essentially the 
cost of raw materials.”261 He explains that in such a world, the need 
for intellectual property laws will be dramatically reduced such that 
“justified instances of IP will become islands in a sea of cheap goods, 
content, and even services delivered to your home in the form of 
digital information.”262 
But Professor Lemley’s world without scarcity does not yet exist (as 
he readily admits).263 Adjusting patent law as a whole based on DMT 
does not yet make sense because DMT does not yet account for a 
significant amount of manufacturing.264 And even when it does, it 
likely will not lower innovation costs equally across all technologies. If 
this is so, then lawmakers might decide to avoid weakening all 
patents. Instead, they could weaken only patents covering 
technologies for which DMT has most dramatically lowered 
innovation costs. Technologies most affected by DMT will generally be 
those in which designers can create CAD files that will print finished 
(or nearly finished) products.265 
 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(“The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of 
twenty years counted from the filing date.”). To attempt to avoid problems with 
TRIPS, the PTO could dramatically increase the last of the patent maintenance fees. 
Osborn et al., supra note 254, at 55-59. 
 261 Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity 2 (Stanford Law Sch. of Pub. 
Law, Working Paper No. 2413974, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2413974. 
 262 Id. at 6. 
 263 Id. at 5. 
 264 See WOHLERS ASSOCS., WOHLERS REPORT 2013, at 128 (2013) (noting that in 2012 
the 3D printing industry’s total revenue was about $3.4 billion and that if it captured 
just 1% of the global manufacturing market it would be worth $105 billion). 3D 
printing companies use the technology to produce finished parts in about 28% of their 
work. Id. at 20. 
 265 Finished products that can be 3D printed will tend to have reduced 
prototyping, development, manufacturing, and distribution costs. Osborn et al., supra 
note 254, at 15-35. Even where a manufacturer cannot 3D print a completely finished 
product, patent law traditionally protects against the manufacture of non-staple, key 
components of the product. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2013). If digital patent 
infringement claims do not protect against CAD files that manufacture key 
components of products, the incentives to invent those finished products will be 
reduced. 
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Even before Congress acts, courts could target these DMT-affected 
technologies by refusing to recognize a cause of action for digital 
patent infringement even though selling and transferring CAD files 
harms patentees. This approach has an appeal in that it is inherently 
technology-specific: to the extent DMT reduces the need for patents 
covering specific technologies, only those patents are affected. On the 
other hand, such a decision might best be left to Congress after a 
holistic study of the issue. 
Needless to say, the effects of DMT on the patent system warrant 
careful and thorough study. We cannot here provide an in-depth 
analysis, but we hope that future scholarship will explore this 
important area. 
B. Effects on Laypeople 
DMT and digital patent infringement have the unique potential to 
bring laypeople into intimate contact with patent law, particularly if 
the making, using, and selling of CAD files constitutes direct 
infringement. Such persons have little knowledge of patent law.266 Yet 
DMT may expose them to potentially massive monetary damages267 for 
making, using, selling, and offering to sell CAD files and the 
corresponding physical objects.268 Technically, laypeople commit 
 
 266 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1263-64 (2014) (noting that patent 
infringement is determined from an expert, not lay, point of view); Janis & Holbrook, 
supra note 98 (discussing various persons who may encounter patent law). 
 267 Unlike copyright law’s statutory damages, patent law’s monetary remedies are 
based on actual harm. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (providing for statutory 
damages not tied to actual damages), with 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (allowing damages 
“adequate to compensate for the infringement” and no provision for statutory 
damages). Thus, a patentee would need to prove damages or a reasonable royalty, 
which might be difficult, especially where CAD files are distributed without charge. 
But even uncompleted offers to sell and free transfers of CAD files can harm the 
patentee through lost sales and price erosion. See supra note 125 (discussing price 
erosion). A patentee can also obtain an injunction to stop future infringement. See 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 268 Whether or not courts recognize a cause of action for digital infringement, 
individuals who print physical objects will be liable as infringers. See, e.g., Doherty, 
supra note 18, at 358-60 (describing how 3D printing will expose laypeople to claims 
for patent infringement for printing physical objects). But finding these individuals 
will be very difficult because they are likely to print the objects in the privacy of their 
home. Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1496 (“[S]ince most infringement occurs inside 
private homes, there is a greater perception of safety and anonymity with 
unauthorized 3D printing than when purchasing illegal goods in markets or online 
using a credit card. Like music and movie downloading on peer-to-peer networks, 
most infringement will be difficult to detect.”). A cause of action for digital 
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patent infringement often even outside of the DMT context. Any time 
laypersons use an infringing device — such as a cell phone that might 
be covered by thousands of patents — they are infringing any relevant 
patents by using the invention.269 Thus far, however, patentees have 
generally not sued individual end users, likely because (1) they can 
more efficiently sue upstream, centralized, and deep-pocketed 
companies, and (2) suing one’s customers is hardly a good business 
model for engendering customer goodwill.270 
The potential for such widespread liability in the general public is 
comparable to laypeople’s exposure to copyright infringement claims 
in the Napster and Grokster era, when copyright holders demanded 
huge sums of money from teenagers and other individuals.271 Just as 
copyright infringement lawsuits against individuals created a 
normative backlash against the copyright system and copyright 
holders,272 patent infringement lawsuits against unwitting infringers 
would likely energize the masses against patent law and patent 
holders. Indeed, we have already seen such a backlash against patent 
assertion entities, pejoratively referred to as patent trolls, who have 
sued small actors like coffee shops.273 The difficulties for patent law 
are even greater than they were for copyright because patent law does 
not require copying. Moreover, patents are opaque documents,274 
directed to technologists and lawyers,275 so even laypersons who may 
be aware of the patent would likely have no idea whether they 
infringe.276 Most people who copied music knew they were doing 
 
infringement would undoubtedly increase legal exposure of individuals. 
 269 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining unauthorized use of patented invention as act 
of direct infringement). The smart phone users would not be infringing if the 
manufacturer of the phone had obtained a license, thus exhausting the patent rights as 
to the consumer. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 635-38 
(2008). 
 270 See Hughes, supra note 14, at 728-29 (summarizing arguments against suing 
customers, but arguing that sometimes it may be a good idea). 
 271 Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students over Music Sharing, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/23/us/recording-industry-
goes-after-students-over-music-sharing.html. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See Scott Joslove, Patent Trolls Threaten Small Businesses, THE HILL CONGRESS 
BLOG (Dec. 05, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-
budget/192096-patent-trolls-threaten-small-businesses. 
 274 Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 
633-41 (2010) (discussing the complex language of patents). 
 275 Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 
785-86 (2011) (discussing technical and legal nature of the patent document). 
 276 Janis & Holbrook, supra note 98, at 88-89 & n.53. 
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something the law forbade,277 but individuals are unlikely to have any 
idea that CAD files and their physical instantiations infringe a 
patent.278 Further, even if someone became concerned about patent 
infringement, determining whether the patent was infringed would 
likely require an expensive attorney, and even then a large zone of 
uncertainty may persist.279 
As DMT matures, lawmakers and patent holders should pay careful 
attention to societal norms surrounding patent law. If laypeople see 
patent laws as unfair or unduly burdensome, they may decide to break 
the law or to advocate for change to it.280 As Professor Wu described 
in the copyright context, a legal regime is susceptible to technological 
avoidance strategies when it lacks normative support.281 Thus, if 
societal norms differ extensively from patent law’s regime, a wave of 
internet-based patent “piracy” may emerge.282 Minimally, such a 
normative shift could threaten the legitimacy of the patent system.283 
 
 277 See David McGuire, Report: Kids Pirate Music Freely, WASH. POST (May 18, 2004, 
5:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37231-2004May18.html 
(“More than half of young Americans with Internet access continue to download free 
music even though they know that they are breaking the law, according to a poll 
released today.”). 
 278 See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. Many people will be completely 
unaware that a patent exists. WEINBERG, IT WILL BE AWESOME, supra note 18, at 5. 
 279 Patent infringement is notoriously difficult to predict accurately because it 
involves so many indeterminate inquiries, such as validity, claim construction, and the 
doctrine of equivalents. See supra notes 95–96. 
 280 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 605-07 (discussing change 
and avoidance responses to laws). 
 281 Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 707-08 (2003) (stating that a 
regime that relies on gatekeeper enforcement and lacks normative support is 
susceptible to technological avoidance strategies). 
 282 See Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1493 (“Users of 3D printers will likely form 
beliefs and attitudes that support liberal uses of 3D printers and will reject legal 
reform to the contrary. Users of 3D printers might experience loss aversion when what 
they consider to be legitimate is suddenly found to be illegal. In this process, the 
perception of having something ‘taken away’ might add to the resistance we can 
expect when IP rights will be enforced on products of 3D printing.”); Osborn, 
Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 619 (“To the extent [patent law] does not 
suffer from a normative weakness, 3D printing will pose less of a piracy threat to the 
patent regime than to the copyright and trademark regimes.”). 
 283 See generally Depoorter, supra note 14, at 1498-99 (“If the public perceives 
enforcement to be excessive, this might reinforce or strengthen a belief that the legal 
regime is not legitimate or that a legal rule is unjust.”); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark 
D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 13) (on file with authors) (discussing the Supreme Court’s potential concerns in 
eligibility doctrine with the legitimacy of the patent system). 
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Facing the prospect of massive infringement by the general public, 
courts may decide to avoid this problem by not recognizing claims for 
digital patent infringement. Another option would be simply to 
exempt individuals from patent infringement suits involving digital 
patent infringement, similar to proposals made in the patent assertion 
entity context.284 Such a step, however, would need to be legislative 
because the patent statute does not contain any such carveouts. 
Both of these proposed solutions, however, are overbroad: they 
would protect not only innocent laypersons but also intentional, 
repeat infringers who appropriate a significant share of a patent’s 
value. To resolve this problem, one could extend liability only to those 
making commercial use of the patented invention.285 In addition, the 
law could extend liability only to individual infringers who bear some 
culpability, rejecting the current strict liability regime. Culpability 
could range from an intent to infringe, knowledge of infringement, 
recklessness, negligence, or simply having actual notice of a patent. 
The highest standards, intent to infringe and knowledge of 
infringement, would make it difficult for patentees to enforce their 
patent for the same reasons as in the indirect infringement context.286 
Intermediate standards like recklessness and negligence would give 
courts flexibility to work toward a fair result, but would come at the 
costs of uncertainty and litigation expense. An objective test that asks 
whether the accused infringer had actual notice of the patent reduces 
uncertainty and expense, but puts a relatively high burden on 
laypeople to ascertain the merits of a potential patent dispute. 
Alternatively, courts could use remedies to achieve the same 
objectives. Courts could decline to use injunctive relief against 
innocent infringers. As to damages, courts could use an infringer’s 
status as an innocent infringer to reduce the damages considerably, 
with a reasonable royalty rate approaching zero. This flexibility is in 
sharp contrast to copyright law, which has statutory damages that 
limit courts’ discretion.287 Whereas judges have no choice to award 
 
 284 E.g., Legislative Solutions for Patent Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/legislative-solutions-patent-reform (last visited Aug. 8, 
2014) (“End-user immunity — The law should not allow trolls to prey on end 
users.”). 
 285 For a proposal along these lines, but for the actual printing of the physical 
object, see Doherty, supra note 18, at 368-69. Another proposal, also offered in the 
context of printing the physical object, suggests limiting infringement suits to those 
involving a minimum amount in controversy. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39, 
at 1717. 
 286 See supra notes 81–101 and accompanying text. 
 287 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
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statutory damages if plaintiffs elect that remedy in the copyright 
context, judges have greater flexibility in the patent context to address 
concerns of digital infringement against innocent infringers from the 
general public. 
In sum, DMT will expose laypersons to patent infringement liability 
on an unprecedented scale. As this potential becomes reality, various 
actors in the patent system must be prepared to address the potential 
consequences. Our purpose is to highlight some of these issues; it is 
far beyond the scope of this Article to be able to address all of them. 
We leave those questions to future study. 
C. Effects on Intermediaries288 
Individuals are not the only group affected by digital patent 
infringement. With digital infringement, websites and other 
intermediaries that host CAD files may be exposed to additional 
liability beyond concerns of indirect infringement.289 With each 
assertion of direct infringement, intermediaries would face the same 
expense and uncertainty as individuals do. While intermediaries might 
have more resources than individuals, they could face a staggering 
number of infringement assertions because they host many files. 
Rather than face the expense and distraction of defending patent suits, 
the intermediaries may simply shut down even if only a small 
percentage of their files were infringing. But losing legitimate CAD file 
intermediaries would harm DMT’s progress and leave society without 
useful tools for sharing legitimate CAD files. 
These intermediaries resemble those involved in copyright disputes 
(such as YouTube and Napster) in that they host files without direct 
knowledge of each specific file on their site.290 Realizing this 
similarity, commentators have proposed to protect innocent 
intermediaries from indirect infringement claims by enacting a 
DMCA-like regime291for the patent context.292 Such a regime would 
 
 288 Here, we mean online intermediaries, in contrast to the manufacturing 
intermediaries that are needed in traditional manufacturing contexts. See Depoorter, 
supra note 14, at 1495 (discussing “intermediaries in manufacturing”). 
 289 See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 290 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922-24 
(2005). 
 291 For a description of the DMCA, see Doherty, supra note 18, at 365-66. 
 292 A well-written student note represents an early example of this proposal. See id. 
at 365-68. Other commentators have echoed this call. See, e.g., Desai & Magliocca, 
supra note 39, at 1718-19 (arguing for extending the notice-and-takedown rules of the 
DMCA to patents and trade dress). 
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allow patent holders to send take-down requests for files they believe 
infringe, and the intermediary could protect itself from infringement 
claims if it took the file down.293 Such a proposal could be extended to 
direct digital infringement. Under this regime, intermediaries would 
be immune from liability until they have actual notice of a claim for 
infringement. We realize that, as in the copyright context,294 a 
takedown regime may be abused and lead to non-infringing material 
being removed. Further, the cost of evaluating a responding to 
takedown notices may result in a de facto extrajudicial regime where 
any assertion by a patent holder results in the removal of the file. 
Recognizing these flaws, we nonetheless believe that if courts choose 
to recognize claims for digital infringement, a DMCA-like process 
would be preferable to a regime where intermediaries face liability for 
direct digital infringement even without actual notice of a patent. 
D. Spillover Effects 
Recognizing a cause of action for digital patent infringement would 
yield many follow-on effects, some of which we have identified 
herein.295 One secondary effect we wish to highlight is our expectation 
that patent holders would seek to extend the logic to software patents 
by analogy.296 Patent law does not permit claiming software in the 
abstract, but courts did allow claims directed to software loaded on 
computer-readable medium.297 In the aftermath the Supreme Court’s 
 
 293 Doherty, supra note 18, at 365-68. 
 294 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling 
Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 666-79 (2006) (describing various 
problems with DMCA takedown notices in a data set studied by the authors). 
 295 See supra note 239. 
 296 We recognize that software patents are notoriously difficult to define. See Mark 
A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 
905, 931 n.102 [hereinafter Software Patents] (listing several attempts to define 
software patents). Although CAD files fall under a broad definition of software, here 
we define software as “the programs that run on a computer and perform certain 
functions.” Software, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
software (last visited July 1, 2014). Thus, as we use the terms, patented “software” 
relates to application programs that run on a general-purpose computer, whereas 
“files” connote collections of data used by software programs. See File, 
TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/file (last visited July 2, 2014). 
In this usage, software programs include AutoCAD or Microsoft Word, which interact 
with files such as CAD files or Word documents, respectively. 
 297 See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2001) (discussing the history of software 
patents). Computer-readable media include CDs and diskettes. Courts also allowed 
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decision in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, it remains 
unclear to what extent, if at all, computer software remains patent 
eligible.298 
One popular patent claim format for capturing a software-on-
readable-medium invention has been the Beauregard claim, based on 
the eponymous case that allowed such claims.299 A Beauregard-style 
claim would give a patent holder direct control over infringing files,300 
but the viability of these claims (and other software patent claims) are 
in doubt in light of recent case law.301 Because Beauregard-style claims 
are of doubtful validity, patentees might seek to extend digital 
infringement logic to non-3D printing patent claims that require 
software loaded on a computer.302 
Even if courts recognize a cause of action for digital patent 
infringement for CAD files, we think reasons exist for not extending 
analogous actions to traditional software patent infringement. As an 
 
software to be claimed through method and system claims. Id. at 10-11. 
 298 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (requiring 
software to improve functioning of computer to be eligible subject matter and stating 
that mere implementation on generic computers is insufficient); Timothy R. Holbrook 
& Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. OF ENT. 
& TECH. L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 110-15) (on file with authors) 
(criticizing the “eligibility as king” dynamic emerging in patent doctrine). 
 299 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating the Patent 
Office Board of Appeal’s decision because the parties, one of whom was the 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, had come to share the view “that computer 
programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101”). 
 300 See Osborn, Regulating 3D Printing, supra note 5, at 587 n.206; Dillon, supra 
note 18, at 452-55. 
 301 See, e.g., Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (finding patent claims invalid as too 
abstract where the claims were directed to a computer system and method for assisting 
with closing financial transactions in a way that avoids settlement risk); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (rejecting the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” 
test used in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Planet Bingo LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1009 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a computer-aided method and system for managing a 
game of bingo); Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating a process of combining two datasets into a single 
data set); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (invalidating a Beauregard-style claim); see also David L. Schwartz, 
Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1562-64 (2014); Ashby Jones, 
Courts Nix More Software Patents, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2014, 7:48 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/federal-courts-reject-more-software-patents-after-
supreme-court-ruling-1411343300 (detailing patents invalidated after Alice Corp.). 
 302 For an example of such a claim, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 
437 (2007). See also supra notes 133–59 and accompanying text. 
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initial matter, we observe that in contrast to the many-times intangible 
outputs of criticized software patents,303 CAD files produce mechanical 
objects that lie at core of traditional patentable subject matter. 
Furthermore, whatever criticisms exist against digital patent 
infringement for CAD files, even more criticisms exist against software 
patents.304 One criticism is that software patent claims have an 
uncertain scope and meaning, thus making infringement difficult to 
determine.305 With digital patent infringement, however, the patent 
claims are directed to traditional apparatus claims, which involve much 
less uncertainty. Second, software patents may be less likely to be valid 
than other kinds of patents,306 but no evidence suggests that the 
mechanical patents that would be involved in digital patent 
infringement are of suspect validity. Third, observers assert that 
software patents are overbroad, using functional claims to cover more 
than what was actually invented.307 These criticisms would generally 
not apply to mechanical devices.308 Finally, software patents tend to be 
associated with patent thickets, defensive patenting,309 and patent trolls 
 
 303 See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software 
and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 833-36 (2003) (criticizing 
software and business method patents); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible 
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System 
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 578-79 (1999) (discussing business method 
patents, many of which are software patents). 
 304 See, e.g., Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 928 (“Software patents are 
widely acknowledged as creating a large number of problems for the patent system.”). 
But see David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote Address at the 
Center for American Progress: An Examination of Software Patents (Nov. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_CAP.jsp (arguing in 
favor of software patents). 
 305 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744-45 (2009). 
 306 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707-09 (2011); Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software 
Patent Experiment, BUS. REV., July–Sept. 2004, at 22, 24-27, available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2004/ 
q3/brq304rh.pdf. 
 307 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the 
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1400 
(2013) (“Software patents are overbroad. Compared to patents in other fields of 
endeavor, they routinely grant inventors rights that extend further beyond the 
technology that an inventor has actually invented and disclosed.”); Lemley, Software 
Patents, supra note 296, at 907-08. 
 308 Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 908-09 (“This is a problem 
primarily in software.”). 
 309 Defensive patenting refers to “the strategy of obtaining patent protection without 
necessarily intending to assert or enforce those negative rights associated with a patent.” 
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(non-practicing entities).310 Although patents directed to mechanical 
devices are not immune from contributing to these phenomena, no 
data suggest that they do so disproportionately. Cumulatively, these 
arguments against software patents suggest courts should hesitate 
before extending additional patent protection for software. 
Moreover, courts need not extend digital patent infringement to 
traditional software patents because they enjoy additional protection 
via copyright.311 Copyright protection is important to software 
developers precisely because it allows them a measure of control over 
the unauthorized distribution of software code uncombined with 
hardware.312 The drawback of copyright is that it protects against only 
near-verbatim copying of the software,313 while patents protect 
software functionality more broadly.314 Nevertheless, the ability to 
stop the pirates who copy software verbatim is a valuable tool for 
software developers.315 
Admittedly, CAD files may be eligible for copyright protection,316 
but such protection will likely be more limited than even that for 
computer programs. CAD files fit within copyright law’s definition of a 
computer program,317 but are unlikely to contain creativity in the 
same way as program software. Unlike program software, which 
developers structure in part based on creative expression, the text or 
code of CAD files is unlikely to be structured creatively.318 For this 
 
Dan Pierron, Defensive Patenting, WIDERMAN MALEK (May 23, 2013, 8:57 AM), 
http://www.legalteamusa.net/tacticalip/2013/05/23/defensive-patenting. Companies obtain 
these defensive patents as a determent against others suing them. Id. 
 310 See Lemley, Software Patents, supra note 296, at 928-29, 932-34. 
 311 Computer programs enjoy dual protection under both copyright and patent 
law: the creative, as opposed to utilitarian, aspects of computer software are protected 
as literary works under copyright law. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer 
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983); see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). 
 312 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1369 (1987) (noting that copyright “inhibit[s] competing firms 
from reproducing [software] on a mass scale”). 
 313 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 1746, 1770 (2011) (noting that copyright law as applied to 
software “generally results in programs having thin copyright protection”); see also 
Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825. 
 314 Many say too broadly. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 296, at 5. 
 315 Menell, supra note 312, at 1369. 
 316 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825-34 (analyzing the possibility 
of protecting CAD files through copyright). 
 317 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a computer program as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a 
certain result”). 
 318 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 825-26. Although the object 
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reason, CAD files are protectable under copyright, if at all, as pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural (“PGS”) works.319 Although the categorization 
of CAD files under copyright law may be tedious, it is not 
inconsequential. As PGS works, CAD files must contain originality 
and are only protectable to the extent that they are not useful 
articles.320 These requirements limit protections for files created by 
scanning and perhaps files drawn manually if they lack originality.321 
It is possible that courts might construe all CAD files for utilitarian 
objects as useful articles because their primary purpose is utilitarian — 
to instruct a printer how to make a useful object.322 While a detailed 
copyright analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, at least some 
CAD files will not be protectable by copyright and uncertainty exists 
as to many others.323 
Finally, even if a particular CAD file had copyright protection, that 
would not prevent another person from independently creating his 
own CAD file. Where copyright law does not protect the underlying 
physical object (for example, because it is a useful article), anyone is 
free to make her own CAD file of it; they simply cannot copy the 
copyrighted CAD file.324 Because 3D scanners and related technology 
may allow for virtually costless independent creation of CAD files 
 
embodied in the CAD file may be creative, the actual “code” used to describe it will 
simply be the exact, uncreative instructions needed to depict the object. Program 
software, in contrast, can contain creative organization. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 319 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining PGS works in part as “two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art 
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, 
including architectural plans”). 
 320 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 826-33. 
 321 MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH COPYRIGHT AND 3D 
PRINTING? 15-20 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter WHAT’S THE DEAL], available at 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright
_%20Final%20version2.pdf; Desai & Magliocca, supra note 39, at 1706-08; Osborn, 
Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 828-31. 
 322 Osborn, Art and 3D Printing, supra note 39, at 832-33. 
 323 For a fuller exposition of these points, see id. at 824-835. See also WEINBERG, 
WHAT’S THE DEAL, supra note 321, at 5-22. 
 324 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903). This is 
why more than one artist can paint a picture of Mount Everest: Mount Everest is not 
copyrightable. But one cannot copy another’s painting of Mount Everest, because the 
painting is protected by copyright. Id. at 249 (“Others are free to copy the original. 
They are not free to copy the copy.”). To put this in the DMT context, copyright law 
will not stop someone from independently creating a CAD file of a fuel injector 
(which is not copyrightable because it is a useful article), either from scratch or by 3D 
scanning it. 
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from physical objects, any copyright protection of CAD files for 
utilitarian objects may be valueless.325 
In sum, commentators heavily criticize software patents, and 
copyright law can protect software. Hence, even if courts recognize 
claims for digital patent infringement for CAD files, we do not think 
an analogous extension should be made for software-combined-with-
hardware patents. 
E. Impact on Follow-On Innovation 
The patent system is not concerned with creating incentives for 
merely the first invention.326 Patents disclose the invention,327 
encouraging other innovators to draw on the teachings of the patent 
and to improve upon it or design around it.328 If a follow-on innovator 
makes the invention, then technically they are infringing, as there are 
only extremely limited safe harbors for experimenting with patented 
inventions.329 One way to avoid this problem is for a follow-on 
innovator to create computer models or designs of the patented 
invention, and then to alter them virtually to explore ways to improve 
or design around the patent.330 
A robust regime of digital patent infringement could undermine the 
ability of others to design around the patented invention.331 If we view 
creation of the CAD file as a form of “making” the claimed invention, 
then even these digital efforts to design around would technically be a 
 
 325 Although software may also be reverse engineered, the underlying object (the 
software code) is protected by copyright. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 
F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is now well settled that the literal elements of 
computer programs, i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright 
protection.”). 
 326 See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design 
around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady 
flow of innovations to the marketplace.”). 
 327 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 328 Holbrook, Possession, supra note 259, at 131-32; Osborn, Ripple Effects, supra 
note 221, at 583-84. 
 329 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 81, 83. 
 330 See B. Thomas Watson, Carbons into Bytes: Patented Chemical Compound 
Protection in the Virtual World, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 25, 28-29 (2014) (describing 
the use of molecular modeling to avoid infringing a patent to a chemical). 
 331 Cf. Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 9, at 779 (“An overly broad definition 
of offer to sell infringement could have a chilling effect on competitors, particularly 
attempts to design around the patent.”). 
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form of infringement. These concerns about downstream users 
counsel against extending the definition of “making” to these 
activities. In contrast, allowing “sales” of, and “offers to sell,” CAD 
files to constitute infringement may not encounter the same concerns, 
or at least not to the same degree. Sales activity necessarily means that 
a party is attempting to commercialize the invention, appropriating its 
economic value.332 There is less concern that the infringer is seeking to 
improve upon the invention in this context. Consideration of these 
downstream impacts supports a bifurcated approach: maintain a 
tangibility requirement for “making” the patented invention, but 
permit intangible infringement by “selling” or “offering to sell” the 
claimed innovation. 
Whether to extend patent law in the ways we have explored is 
clearly a complex question. Even though digital infringement, 
particularly direct infringement, is justifiable on technical terms, such 
an expansion may work considerable costs on other parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The interaction of the patent system and DMT is a difficult one. The 
extent to which the patent system should respond to the unique issues 
that DMT present is a vexing question that could have significant 
impacts on the incentives that patents are intended to provide. On one 
hand, the proliferation of such technologies likely will negatively 
impact patent owners, making it more difficult for inventors to protect 
their innovations from unauthorized appropriation. This concern 
suggests that the patent system should accommodate greater patent 
protection, be it through indirect infringement or, as we posit in this 
Article, expanded views of direct infringement. On the other hand, an 
overly broad expansion of patent protection could work considerable 
costs and negative collateral impacts on third parties and other 
incentives, such as the incentive to design around patented 
technologies. Given the potency of patents’ exclusive rights, courts or 
Congress must carefully consider the benefits and disadvantages of 
expansively applying patent infringement doctrine to emerging DMT. 
Nevertheless, we believe that affording protection to patent holders 
against sales or offers to sell the CAD files strikes the appropriate 
balance. In this context, the accused infringer is seeking to extract the 
commercial value of the invention, undermining the value of the patent 
to the patentee. Liability here is less likely to trigger the collateral 
consequences that we have addressed because the infringer is directly 
 
 332 Id. at 805. 
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competing with the patent holder in some way, as opposed to merely 
using CAD files to design around the patent. The economic value of the 
patented invention is what will drive the commercial demand for the 
CAD file. As such, we believe that an extension of Transocean is an 
appropriate way to protect patent holders’ economic interests. 
Whether a CAD file should constitute an infringing “making” of the 
claimed invention presents far more complex issues. As a technological 
matter, we believe that the divide between the tangible and intangible 
has been almost entirely bridged by DMT. Because the physical 
instantiation of the patented article is a mere touch of the button away, 
treating the CAD file differently than the product produced by the 3D 
printer seems arbitrary. From this technological perspective, then, the 
courts could reasonably conclude that a CAD file alone constitutes an 
infringing “making” of the claimed invention, even if the invention is 
never printed. To reject this approach risks creating significant gaps in 
the protection that a patent affords to its owner. 
Yet, this extension gives us pause because of the potential collateral 
consequences that would arise. Because patent infringement is a strict 
liability tort, permitting CAD files alone to be infringing, even in the 
absence of commercial activity, would open up a wide swath of 
potential liability. Someone who is simply are scanning a patented 
item into a CAD file could now be viewed as infringing, having 
reconstructed the device via the CAD file. Persons creating CAD files, 
either by designing them or by scanning an item, differ significantly 
from persons seeking to commercialize CAD files through sales or 
offers to sell. Thus, we are not so sanguine that liability for making a 
patented invention should extend to CAD files alone. Any such 
expansion — be it by the courts or Congress — should only take place 
after a careful consideration of the externalities such liability could 
generate. 
 
